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ABSTRACT 
Impairment in social interaction is one of the defming characteristics of autistic-
spectrum disorders. Three factors that may influence the pattern of social skills 
deficits in autistic individuals are explored in the present study. 
1. Can the autistic individual pass theory of mind tasks? Baron-Cohen, Leslie and 
Frith (1985) suggested that the core impairments of autism could be explained by 
an inability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. The term ''theory of 
mind" is used to refer to this ability to represent mental states. 
2. Does the autistic individual use logical/factual or mentalist strategies to solve 
theory of mind tasks? Happe (1994) suggested that if success on theory of mind 
tasks was due to the use of a logical strategy, this would explain why these 
individuals were still socially impaired. The underlying reasoning strategy about 
social situations may have an influence on everyday social interactions. 
3. Is general social reasoning influencing theory of mind task performance and 
achievement of everyday social skills? Several suggestions have been made as to 
possible reasoning strategies that may be used by children with autistic spectrum 
disorders to solve theory of mind tasks or to circumvent a lack of theory of mind 
ability in everyday life. 
Children with high-functioning autism/Asperger's Syndrome were tested with a 
battery of theory of mind tasks (1st and 2nd order) and social reasoning tasks. Their 
performance on these tasks was compared to their everyday social skills as assessed 
by the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow et al, 1984) and other parent-
rated questionnaires. Results were reported and discussed in the context of the 
ii 
relevant literature. The effects of theory of mind ability, social reasoning skills and 
the central drive for coherence on the everyday social skills of autistic children were 
discussed. Implications for clinical interventions for social skills deficits in children 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Organisation of Introduction 
The introduction to this thesis begins with a brief description of autism and 
Asperger' s syndrome and how they are related in the spectrum of autistic disorders. 
The social impairments characteristic of autistic-spectrum disorders are then 
reviewed, with reference to the theory of mind hypothesis where appropriate, as it is 
these that the "Theory of Mind" and other hypotheses seek to explain. The next 
sections define theory of mind and describe the background to the hypothesis, as well 
as reviewing empirical evidence supporting and conflicting with the theory of mind 
deficit account of autism. Other hypotheses seeking to explain the pattern of social 
skills and deficits in autism, such as alternative strategies for passing theory of mind 
tasks or a tendency to focus on the separate parts rather than the integrated whole 
(weak central coherence), are then described. Social reasoning is briefly reviewed. 
The relationship between theory of mind, the use of mental state language, social 
reasoning and everyday social behaviour is then discussed. Finally, the aims and 
hypotheses derived from the previous research described in this introduction are 
presented. 
1.2 The Autistic Spectrum 
The first description of autism as a distinct disorder was provided by Kanner in 1943. 
He described a group of children with a set of key behavioural features, including 
communication impairments and "autistic aloneness". Just one year later, Asperger 
published independently a description of "autistic psychopathy" in childhood 
(Asperger, 1944~ reprinted and translated in Frith, 1991 ). These two syndromes 
involved many similar features and both emphasised the child's social impairments 
as characteristic of the disorder. Later observations confirmed three core deficits that 
were present in nearly all autistic individuals: 
• a general failure to develop social relationships and specific impairments tn 
social interactions, 
• absence or impairment of verbal and non-verbal forms of communication, 
• absence or impairment of imagination, and repetitive, stereotyped activity. 
Since the first publications in the 1940's, there has been a debate about whether 
Kanner's 'classic' autism and Asperger' s syndrome are descriptions of the same 
disorder, entirely different disorders, or two points on a spectrum of autistic features 
(e.g. Bowler, 1992; Wing & Gould, 1979). Early discussions on the nature of the 
relationship between Asperger's and Kanner's syndromes recognised some link 
between the two conditions while maintaining they were distinct disorders (e.g. 
Asperger, 1979; Van Krevelen, 1971 ). Those who argue for two distinct syndromes 
generally consider Asperger's syndrome to be a form of personality disorder (Nagy 
& Szatmari, 1986; Wolff & Chick, 1980), and Kanner' s autism to be a 
developmental disorder (Wolff & Chick, 1980) or a form of psychosis (Kay & 
Kolvin, 1987). 
Some children with characteristic features of Kanner's autism in early childhood 
later develop language and social skills and cognitive abilities within the average 
range. These children are often labelled with the term high-functioning autism. 
There were some, mainly clinicians, who saw close similarities between Asperger' s 
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syndrome and high-functioning autism 1n terms of clinical presentation and 
behavioural features (Schopler, 1985). Common to both disorders are impairments 
in social functioning and imagination, as well as the absence of joint attention 
behaviours (see Section 1.3 for definition). The majority of children with autistic 
syndromes have significant learning disabilities, but children with any level of 
intellectual ability can have autism (Wing & Gould, 1979). DeLong & Dwyer 
(1988) suggested that the boundary between Kanner's and Asperger's syndromes 
was between high- and low-functioning individuals: high-functioning autism and 
Asperger' s syndrome being equivalent disorders distinct from low-functioning 
autism on the basis of presence or absence of learning disability. 
The existence of impairments common and central to both Kanner' s and Asperger' s 
autism suggests a shared underlying pathology. It was Wing and Gould (1979) who 
first described the concept of an autistic spectrum. They argued that autistic 
individuals could present differing degrees of impairment on the dimensions of 
socialisation, communication, imaginative activity and other psychological and 
physical functions, but that all show impairment in reciprocal social interactions. 
This idea implies that people with Asperger' s syndrome and Kanner' s syndrome of 
'classic' autism represent subsets of a larger population of people with social 
impairment, with Asperger' s syndrome and high-functioning autism showing less 
global intellectual impairment and less impaired language skills than classic 
(Kanner's) autism. The findings from genetic studies that autism is most likely to be 
due to a combined effect of several different genes rather than a single genetic factor 
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(e.g. Pickles, Bolton, MacDonald, Bailey, Le Couteur, Si m & Rutter, 1995) only 
adds weight to the autistic spectrum hypothesis. 
Syndrome delineation has been just one of several fields of research into autism since 
its first description. The aetiology of the disorder, the psychological and behavioural 
nature of autism and clinical interventions have also been foci of research. In 
particular, the pattern of social skills and deficits and their underlying cause(s) has 
been the focus of more recent research, as the need for interventions that produce 
developmental gains has increased (Rutter, 1999). One of the most important areas 
of debate that has come to the fore since the 1980's has centred on the "Theory of 
Mind" deficit account of autism. Briefly, this theory postulates that social 
impairments in autism arise from a lack of awareness of what other people may be 
thinking. Before describing this theory of a cognitive deficit underlying autism, the 
specific nature of social and communicative abilities and deficits in autism should be 
examined, as the relationship between Theory of Mind and social behaviour is the 
focus of the current study. 
1.3 Social Behaviour in Autism 
There are numerous behaviours that have been included in the definition of social 
skills. The Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow, Balla & Cicchetti, 1984), 
for example, a widely used measure of social behaviour, includes sections on self-
care and motor skills. For the purposes of this study, the behaviours included in the 
definition of social behaviour are limited to interpersonal behaviours, such as 
relationships, conversation skills and conflict avoidance skills. 
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Social behaviour is important for all aspects of life for children and affects their later 
adjustment and happiness (Matson & Ollendick, 1988). A child with good social 
adaptation skills will benefit from improved relationships, the ability to solve social 
problems (and thus the ability to avoid conflict) and may also benefit from secondary 
gains such as reward and approval from others (Kelly, 1982). In contrast, poor social 
skills in early life will impede the quality and quantity of early social experiences 
and prevent the learning and development of further social skills in a vicious circle 
with serious long-term consequences (Bierman & Furman, 1984). 
This following section on the social behaviour of autistic individuals begins with 
information on general patterns of social behaviour and early social responsiveness. 
As "social behaviour" could potentially include a very wide range of topics, the 
following segments are limited to the broad categories of interpersonal social 
behaviour that are included in the main social skills measure used in this study, the 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow et al, 1984). 
General Patterns of Social Behaviour 
Wing & Gould ( 1979) described three types of general social impairment found in 
the children in their epidemiological study. While some of the children demonstrated 
the "autistic aloneness" of Kanner and avoided most social contact, others would not 
initiate social contact but would passively accept other people's social approaches. 
The third group of socially impaired children would initiate social contact but the 
interaction would be idiosyncratic and repetitive. Social impairment, rather than 
language impairments or repetitive activities, distinguished children with autistic 
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spectrum disorders from children with general learning disabilities and normal 
children (Wing & Gould, 1979). 
Thus, impairment in social interaction is one of the defining characteristics of autistic 
spectrum disorders. However, the impairment is not uniform. Across the range of 
social behaviours in autistic children, some are preserved, some are impaired and 
some appear to develop at a later stage than in non-autistic children, with variations 
between individuals. 
Attachment 
Little direct information about early social behaviour patterns in autistic infants is 
available as diagnosis is not usually made before the second year. Information about 
early social responsiveness in children with autistic spectrum disorders is therefore 
mainly retrospective. However, several studies have explored early social 
relationships between autistic children and their caregivers (albeit at a later stage 
than with normal children) using the 'strange situation' paradigm. The 'strange 
situation' paradigm involves an infant being left briefly by their caregiver in an 
unfamiliar environment and the response to this disappearance and the reappearance 
of the caregiver is monitored. Non-autistic, securely attached children (at about 12-
24 months old) may or may not be distressed by their caregiver' s absence but all seek 
contact with them on their return. Between 40% to 70% of normal children will 
show this secure attachment response (Smith & Cowie, 1988). 
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Autistic children of three- to four-years-old also showed evidence of secure 
attachment relationships in the 'strange situation', although the responses tended to 
be less intense than those of normal children of the same developmental level 
(Capps, Sigman & Mundy, 1994~ Rogers, Ozonoff & Maslin-Cole, 1991). However, 
separation distress usually subsides in normal three- to four-year-olds, so little 
significance can be placed on autistic children of the same age showing less intense 
separation responses than younger normal children. About 40% of autistic children 
appear securely attached to their caregiver, a proportion similar to children with 
general learning disabilities (Capps, Sigman & Mundy, 1994). 
The early attachments of children have been hypothesised to influence the character 
of later social relationships (Sigman & Capps, 1997). Ho·wever, secure attachment to 
a caregiver may be insufficient for the development of relationships in later life: 
autistic children are as able as children with general learning disabilities to form 
secure attachments, but, in comparison, fail to develop both the number and quality 
of such relationships. This also suggests that the deficit underlying autistic social 
impairments does not impact on social development until a later stage, after initial 
attachments have been made but before wider social behaviour develops. However, 
there is some indication that autistic interpersonal social impairments are present 
before age two (see below). 
Joint Attention 
Joint attention behaviours are non-verbal communicative acts, such as gestures, to 
draw another person's attention to an object. The child's intention behind the gesture 
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may be to get an adult to obtain an object for him/her (protoimperative), or just to 
point out an object of interest (protodeclarative ). The person on the receiving end of 
the gesture must have some understanding of the intent of the child in order to 
respond appropriately. Joint attention behaviours normally develop at about nine 
months of age, but have been shown to be rarely present in the interactions of 
children with autism (Curcio, 1978). More specifically, it is only the 
protodeclarative gestures that are missing from an autistic child's communications 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989a). 
Baron-Cohen (1989a) suggested that joint attention deficits reflect an impairment in 
the understanding of the mental state of attention, and are therefore early indicators 
of a theory of mind deficit. Mundy, Sigman & Kasari (1993) argued that joint 
attention behaviours may involve the integration of emotion and cognition, and that 
integration may aid a child's development of understanding of other people's mental 
lives. Those autistic children who do show joint attention behaviours are likely to 
develop better social communication skills than those who do not (Mundy, Sigman 
& Kasari, 1990). Joint attention behaviours are important to the development of 
social competence as a whole. 
Social Referencing 
From approximately nine months old, infants will look at the faces of their caregivers 
or other people for information. Children will monitor someone's gaze to gather 
information about where they are looking, but also look for information about how 
they are feeling about what they are looking at. In confusing or novel situations, the 
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infant will look and respond to other people's facial expressions - if the adult 
appears frightened the infant will withdraw~ if the adult appears positive, the infant 
will advance on the object or situation drawing its attention (Hornik, Risenhoover & 
Gunnar, 1987). Autistic children are much less likely to look to a caregiver for 
information about an ambiguous situation, and less likely to respond appropriately if 
they do, than non-autistic children or children with general learning disabilities 
(Sigman, Kasari, Kwon & Yirmiya, 1992). This failure to perform social 
referencing behaviours impedes autistic children in their ability to identify and 
assume the attitude of another person. Attempting to see a situation the way another 
person sees it is an important part of learning about and participating in relationships 
and the social culture as a whole (Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993). A social 
referencing deficiency will severely hamper an autistic child's development of social 
understanding. 
Play & Imagination 
One of the core deficiencies of autism is a deficit in imagination. Imagination is 
required for pretend play, where an object may used as if it was an entirely different 
object (e.g. pretending a banana is a telephone), or dolls can do things as if they were 
alive (e.g. 'eating' some food). Children with autistic spectrum disorders rarely 
show pretend play, but will show other types of play (e.g. functional play: using 
objects in accordance with their intended function) as much as their non-autistic 
peers (Ungerer & Sigman, 1981 ). 
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Without outside influence, autistic children are likely to become absorbed in 
repetitive, stereotyped activities (Sigman & Capps, 1997). However, when adults 
actively engage autistic three- or four-year-olds in two-way interactions (e.g. rolling 
a ball back and forth), the autistic children are just as engaged and seek to continue 
the game as much as non-autistic children of the same age (Mundy & Sigman, 1989). 
Autistic children would not initiate this contact without the structure of adult 
prompting (Sigman & Capps, 1997), but they do participate in certain types of play. 
Turn-taking during a simple game is difficult for the majority of autistic children, 
although children with high-functioning autism are as able as children without autism 
at doing so (Lord, 1993). 
Pretend play is considered to be an early indicator of the development of theory of 
mind skills (Leslie, 1987), and is related to the presence of joint attention behaviours 
(Mundy et al, 1990). 
Autistic Behaviour Before the Second Year 
Retrospective studies have tried to determine if there are any early diagnostic 
indicators of autism before the second year by examining home videos (Osterling & 
Dawson, 1994) or infant health records (Johnson, Siddon, Frith and Morton, 1992), 
but have found few significant observable impairments before age 18 months. The 
Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (CHAT) was developed to be used by GPs or 
Health Visitors to facilitate early detection of autism at 18-month screenings (Baron-
Cohen, Alien & Gillberg, 1992). It focuses on elements of social behaviour that have 
been shown empirically to be impaired in autism, including pretend play and 
protodeclarative gesturing. Baron-Cohen et al (1992) found that four children in a 
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group at high risk for developing autism (their siblings having already been 
diagnosed with autism) when screened at 18 months failed to show pretend play and 
joint attention behaviours. In comparison, none of the other children in the study 
(high-risk or randomly selected) failed to demonstrate more than one key behaviour. 
When followed-up at 30 months, only those four children who lacked joint attention 
and pretend play at 18 months had received a diagnosis of autism. This demonstrates 
that autistic children show impairments in social behaviour before two years of age 
(when autism is usually diagnosed) and suggests that impairments in pretend play 
and joint attention may be useful as early indicators of autism (Baron-Cohen et al, 
1992). 
The findings already discussed that autistic children show secure attachment to 
caregivers in pre-school years conflict with the above. It would be interesting to 
examine the attachment patterns at eighteen months of the children identified by the 
CHAT. Joint attention and play deficits may delay attachment until three or four 
years (the ages examined by Capps et al, 1994, and Rogers et al, 1991 ), or they may 
not have any impact on the development of a secure attachment to a caregiver. 
These apparently conflicting findings emphasise that deficits in social behaviour in 
autism are not across the board. Whatever the underlying cause, autism leaves some 
behaviours intact while severely impairing others. 
Emotion Recognition 
Children with autistic spectrum disorders are impaired in both their expression of 
emotions and understanding of other people's emotions. Children with autism 
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appear to be as accurate as children with similar verbal ability at naming simple 
emotions (e.g. happiness, sadness) in facial expressions (Ozonoff, Pennington & 
Rogers, 1990). However, they take significantly more time to do so (Capps, Yirmiya 
& Sigman, 1992), and are less able to match different elements of emotions (voice, 
facial expression, body movements and context) than non-autistic individuals 
(Hobson, 1986). These laboratory findings would have significant impact in 
everyday social interactions, where changes to these various different aspects of 
emotion would need to be quickly monitored, integrated and responded to from 
moment to moment. 
Autistic children also show little empathy. Children without autism and children with 
learning disabilities respond to parents' (feigned) cries of pain or expressions of 
illness by looking concerned or offering comfort. In comparison, children with 
autism failed to make any eye contact or offer any comfort for their parent's 
simulated distress (Sigman et al, 1992). Autistic children may fail this task in part 
because of a lack of understanding of conventional social expressions of sympathy 
(Sigman & Capps, 1997). 
Social referencing appears to play a part in later recognition, and even expression, of 
some more complicated emotions such as embarrassment and pride. Complex 
emotions such as guilt and embarrassment require reference to other people's 
thoughts and feelings (e.g. I'm only embarrassed about my untidy house when I think 
someone else thinks it is dirty). It appears that autistic children's impairment in the 
expression of emotions is limited to these emotions with a referential element. They 
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do show appropriate facial expressions and tone of voice for emotions such as fear, 
anger, happiness, sadness and surprise (Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya & Sigman, 1993), 
although less often than children with learning disabilities or normal children. 
Anger Control and Apologising 
Aggressive and destructive behaviour were common features of Asp erg er's original 
case descriptions (Asperger, 1944; reprinted and translated in Frith, 1991). Adults 
and children with autistic· spectrum disorders may experience more stress and 
frustration, and therefore express more anger, than non-autistic people due to the 
very different ways they react to and interact with the world and other people around 
them. Problems with impulse control in high-functioning autistic individuals appear 
related to idiosyncratic problem solving styles and inflexibility (Attwood, 1998). 
People with autistic spectrum disorders may be less able (or willing) to control their 
angry reactions if they lack an understanding of how their anger effects other people 
(Attwood, 1998). They also appear less aware of the social requirement to apologise 
or make reparations for angry outbursts (Tantam, 1991 ). Such social conventions 
must be learned. There may be a lack of motivation for such learning in autistic 
individuals if understanding of the importance of the mental states of others is 
impaired. 
Conversation Skills 
By the age of two or three years, children are able to take turns in conversation with 
adults and other children. Conversational skills such as joining an existing 
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conversation (without interrupting rudely), elaborating on topics or introducing new, 
mutually interesting topics, continue to develop throughout middle childhood 
(Sigman & Capps, 1997). Effective communication involves assessing what the 
listener knows and feels about certain topics and adjusting the language accordingly. 
Children as young as 2Y2 years show evidence ofbeing able to make the appropriate 
adjustments in conversation (Tomasello & Mannle, 1985). 
In contrast, a large proportion of children with autistic-spectrum disorders have 
severely impaired functional language. Autistic children and adults have particular 
difficulty initiating and maintaining both topic and flow of conversation (Frith, 
1989a). Even when autistic children have good language abilities, they rarely make 
comments that add new and relevant information to an ongoing conversation, unlike 
children with Down's syndrome or normal children (Tager-Fiusberg, 1993). 
Turn-taking in group conversations is laboured as autistic people generally fail to use 
eye contact to regulate flow of speech, and so they interrupt and introduce irrelevant 
topics of conversation, often about their own particular interest (Bruner & Feldman, 
1993). However, children with high-functioning autism or Asperger's syndrome are 
able to take turns appropriately when the number of people in the conversation is 
limited to just two (Bruner & Feldman, 1993). Children with autistic spectrum 
disorders also appear unable to judge a listener's interest in their conversation and 
can maintain long monologues on their favourite subject (Baron-Cohen & Howlin, 
1993). 
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Everyday conversations frequently include many words and phrases that are not 
meant to be taken literally. The meaning of many figurative modes of speech 
(sarcasm, idiom, etc.) depends upon the listener understanding that the intent behind 
the communication was that the statement should not be taken literally. Successful 
interactions depend upon those involved monitoring and judging that the 
communication is being understood as it was intended, and modifying the 
communication when and if required (Baron-Cohen, 1994). Many individuals with 
autism are handicapped by a literal understanding of speech and therefore frequently 
fail to understand others' communicative intent and fail to adjust their own language 
to ensure comprehension by their audience (Sigman & Capps, 1997). 
Conversation with autistic individuals is often only rr1aintained by the frequent 
asking of questions (Hurtig, Ensrud & Tomblin, 1982), a conversational habit that 
many autistic children seem to adopt and carry on into adulthood (Sigman & Capps, 
1997). Autistic children do not appear do develop the understanding that 
conversations involve the (two-way) exchange of information (Tager-Flusberg, 
1993). Children and adults with autistic spectrum disorders also frequently break the 
social rules of conversation by asking questions or making comments that are 
embarrassing or overly personal (Frith, 1989; Tantam, 1991 ). 
Friendship 
As children reach school age, relationships with family members are still important, 
but friendships with peers increasingly become important too. From about age 
seven, children develop stable groups of friends, which in middle childhood are 
15 
defined by gender values and norms (Hartup, 1992). Conformity to these values and 
norms, which are often implicit, is required to remain part of the social group 
(Sigman & Capps, 1997). It is unsurprising that children with autistic spectrum 
disorders often fail to be part of a group, and that what friendships they have are 
often maintained by their parents (Sigman & Capps, 1997). The majority of high-
functioning autistic children, when asked, can identify one or two friends, but do not 
have a 'best friend'. In comparison, non-autistic children could name one or two 
'best friends', as well as a m·uch larger group of friends (Sigman & Capps, 1997). 
Adolescents with high-functioning autism or Asperger's syndrome may develop 
proscribed friendships, perhaps based on restricted interests, but in the main their 
relationships are family based (Attwood, 1998~ Sigman & Capps, 1997), in contrast 
with the drive for independence from the family seen in non-autistic adolescents. 
Summary 
Autistic children fail to perform a wide range of interpersonal social skills. Many of 
these skills can be linked to the ability to understand the mental lives of people, their 
emotions, thoughts and intentions. Poor conversation skills may be related to an 
inability to perceive to intention of the speaker, or to an inability to perceive the 
effect of one's communication on the listener. The ability to avoid conflict with 
others, by controlling angry or hurt reactions, could be adversely affected by a lack 
of understanding of how anger adversely affects other people. The ability to perceive 
or display complex emotions such as embarrassment may be impaired by an inability 
to reflect on other people's negative perceptions. 
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A wide range of social behaviours thus appear to be linked to an awareness of mental 
states. There is a wide variability of social skills and deficits in autism and some 
social skills do develop (in some cases as a result of social skills training). Also, a 
social behaviour may be available in a child's repertoire but not performed for one 
reason or another (e.g. lack of opportunity, lack of motivation, lack of reward, lack of 
knowledge of when to use the social skill). These factors make the task of finding a 
single causal factor underlying the specific pattern of social presentation in autism 
difficult. The Theory of Mind deficit account of autism is an important attempt to 
explain the pattern of preserved and impaired social behaviour specific to that 
disorder. This theory is reviewed next. 
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1.4 Theory of Mind Deficits in Autism 
The impairments in social behaviour seen in children and adults with autism are not 
uniform across the whole autistic spectrum. Nor are all social behaviours impaired; 
some abilities are preserved, especially in high-functioning autistic individuals. One 
explanation of the mix of core impairments and preserved abilities in autism was 
suggested by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith ( 1985). They suggested that social 
impairments, other core impairments and islets of ability, could be explained by a 
single deficit- an inability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. The term 
"theory of mind" is used to refer to this ability to represent mental states. 
What is Theory of Mind? 
Perhaps the most clear and concise definition of theory of mind is that of Baron-
Cohen, Tager-Flusberg and Cohen (1993): 
[Theory of mind is] the ability of normal children to attribute mental states 
(such as beliefs, desires and intentions, etc.) to themselves and other people, as 
a way of making sense of and predicting behaviour (p.3). 
Theory of mind is the ability to think about thoughts ("mentalise"). This ability to 
make judgements about what other people believe to be the case in any given 
situation allows an individual to predict what they will do. For example, I know Jane 
believes her coat is in the wardrobe and I can predict she will look for it there, even 
though her coat is really in the hall. 
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Theory of mind ability can involve different levels of attributions. The most basic 
level (zero order) involves beliefs or concepts about the physical state of the world 
("I know the coat is in the hall"). The next level of theory of mind ability (1st order) 
involves judgements about another person's mental state about the world ("I think 
that Jane thinks her coat is in the wardrobe"). Second order theory of mind involves 
more complex attributions, involving the individual making a judgement about 
another person's mental state with regard to yet another's mental state about the 
world ("I think that Peter thinks that Jane believes her coat is in the hall"). Thus, 
theory of mind ability includes the concept that people have minds and mental states 
that are independent of other people's minds and mental states, and these mental 
states (and not necessarily the real state of the world) influence their behaviour. 
Table 1.1. Examples of mental state terms. 
Mental State Terms Pretend, Imagine, Believe, Know, Want, Attend, 
Perceive, Doubt, Suspect, Hope, Deceive, Intend, 
Happy, Thoughtful, Idea, Forget 
Background 
Premack & Woodruff ( 1978) carried out the original studies on theory of mind, 
examining a chimpanzee's awareness of mental states in others. They argued that 
the chimpanzee's ability to predict and interpret a human's behaviour in terms of 
mental states (using a symbol system) indicated that it had a theory of mind. Later 
discussion about this study pointed out that the critical test of the ability to represent 
mental states is the ability to recognise someone's false belief. Wimmer & Perner 
(1983) therefore devised a false belief task to test I st order theory of mind ability in 
young normal children. The "Sally-Anne" test was designed to be a stringent test of 
the ability to represent mental states. In such false belief tasks, it is possible to 
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distinguish clearly between the child's judgements about their own (true) belief, from 
those based on their knowledge of another person's different (false) belief. 
Consequently, if the child knows the marble is in the red box, but that Sally thinks 
it's in the blue box, when asked where Sally will look for the marble, the child 
should judge that she will look in the wrong place - the blue box. Wimmer & Pemer 
(1983) found using this task that evidence of theory of mind ability did not reliably 
appear until about four years of age in normal development. Using another false 
belief story, they found that 2"d order ability did not develop until between five and 
seven years of age (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). 
Theory of Mind Deficit in Autism. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) adapted Wimmer & Pemer's (1983) task to 
examine theory of mind ability in children with autism, putting forward the 
hypothesis that a deficit in theory of mind ability was the underlying cause of autistic 
children's social and communicative impairments. They found that 80% of their 
autistic participants, compared to 14% of children with Down's Syndrome, failed the 
experimental false belief task, which the researchers claimed demonstrated a problem 
with understanding mental states specific to autism. This basic finding of impairment 
at the 1st order level has been replicated using the same paradigm (e.g. Reed & 
Peterson, 1990), similar paradigms (e.g. Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995) and different 
but comparable methods (Dawson & Fernald, 1987), and all have found some 
proportion ofthe autistic participants fail theory of mind tasks (see Table 1.2). 
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Table 1.2. Mean chronological age (CA) and verbal mental age (VMA) and percentages of 
autistic participants who passed 1st or 2"d order theory of mind tasks in several different 
s tu dies of theo_!Y of mind ability. 
Study Mean Mean Passed Passed 
C.A. V.M.A. 1st Order lad Order 
Prior et al (1990) 9.92 7.16 50% -
S_j)arrevohn & Howie (1995) 10.17 7.75 53% 30% 
Baron-Cohen et al (1985) 11.92 5.42 20% -
Reed & Peterson ( 1990_2 12.00 7.08 15% -
Baron-Cohen (1989) 15.33 7.83 - 0% 
Ta_g_er-Fiusber_g_ & Sullivan (1994a) 16.92 - 90% -
Ta_g_er-Flusber_g_ & Sullivan ( 1994b) 17.08 9.67 - 58% 
Bowler (1992) 26.67 - 93% 73% 
The now classic Sally-~e paradigm examines the ability to make a judgement 
about another person's mental state in relation to the physical world - 1st order 
theory of mind ability ("I think that John thinks that ... "). The next level of theory of 
mind requires the individual to make a judgement about another person's mental 
state with regard to yet another's mental state about the world ("I think that John 
thinks that Mary thinks ... "). 
One method that has been used to examine this 2nd order theory of mind ability is the 
Ice Cream Van Story. This 2nd order false belief story (described in full in Sections 
2.3 and 2.4) relates a series of events about a child, John, who wants to buy an ice 
cream. After the ice cream man changes his mind about where he will sell his ice 
cream, another character in the story, Mary, comes to hold a false belief about where 
John has gone to buy the ice cream. Again, the listener's true belief about the 
whereabouts of John can be distinguished clearly from the false belief of the story 
character, Mary. 
Baron-Cohen (1989) examined 2nd order theory of mind ability with the Ice Cream 
Van Story in a group of autistic children who were able to pass a 1st order theory of 
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mind task (the Sally-Anne task). This group of autistic children, in comparison to 
learning disabled and normal controls, was impaired in their ability to make 2nd order 
belief attributions. All the control participants in this study were able to justify their 
answers to the false belief question in this study with znd order explanations, unlike 
the autistic participants who were more likely to use (incorrect) 1st order 
justifications or physical justifications. Baron-Cohen {1989) concluded that, 
although some children with autism were able to develop the first level of theory of 
mind ability' they were specifically delayed in their development of znd order theory 
of mind, and a high verbal ability was Ha necessary but not sufficient condition" for 
the acquisition of any level of theory of mind. 
Holroyd & Baron-Cohen (1993) followed up the same group of autistic children 
from the Baron-Cohen et al (1985) study seven years later to fmd out how much, if 
any, development in theory of mind ability there had been. Only one child who had 
previously failed the Sally-Anne task passed in this follow-up study, although two 
who had previously passed now failed, despite a general increase in verbal mental 
age. Overall, there was no change in theory of mind ability over the seven years gap 
between studies. Holroyd & Baron-Cohen (1993) concluded there was a limit on 
development of theory of mind in autistic children at about the 1st order level, 
although the test-retest reliability of the Sally-Anne task could have been a factor 
influencing the results. This conclusion conflicts with the results of those studies 
that have found some autistic children able to pass znd order theory of mind tasks 
(e.g. Bowler, 1992). 
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Bowler (1992) aimed to replicate and extend the fmdings of Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989) with young adults with 
Asperger's syndrome. However, he found very different results: that 93% of these 
participants passed the 1st order task, and 73% passed the 2nd order task, 
performances not significantly different from the control groups of students and 
people with schizophrenia. 
Also in contrast to Baron-Cohen's (1989) results, the autistic and control participants 
in Bowler's (1992) study all failed to give 2nd order justifications for their (mainly 
correct) answers to the 2nd order belief question. Bowler (1992) examined the 
reasons given for the answers to false belief questions and found that most of his 
participants' justifications focussed on the point of the story where the false belief is 
explicitly set up (when the ice cream man changes his mind about where he will sell 
his ice creams). 
Bowler (1992) was able to increase all participants' use of mental state justifications 
in a revised 2nd order false belief story, by changing the event leading to the false 
belief in the story to a random rather than explicit act. This supported Bowler's 
argument that the nature and wording of the story influences the types of 
explanations used. However, as mental state justifications were still rare in all the 
participant groups in this study, Bowler (1992) suggested that social impainnent was 
not predicted by failure to use mental state terms in justifications. 
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Other researchers have also found evidence of theory of mind task success in 
individuals with autistic spectrum disorders. Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) found 
53o/~ of children with high-functioning autism in their study passed a 1st order task 
and 30% passed the 2nd order Ice Cream Van task. Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan 
(1994a) found a greater proportion (90%) of autistic children and adults passed 1st 
order false belief tasks and in a different study by the same authors, 58o/o of children 
and young adults with autistic spectrum disorders passed a 2nd order false belief task 
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, .1994b ). 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (1994a) suggested that the relatively good performance of 
their autistic participants on 1st order false belief tasks, in comparison with Baron-
Cohen et al (1985), was strongly influenced by verbal ability, particularly knowledge 
of complex sentence structure. Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (1994b) concluded that 
children who passed 1st order false belief tasks had difficulty with 2"d order tasks 
because of the increased information processing demands of 2nd order tasks, rather 
than difficulties in reasoning about beliefs about beliefs per se. 
Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) explained the differences in task success between their 
study and studies by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Baron-
Cohen, 1989; Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993) with reference to confounding factors 
such as verbal and non-verbal ability, or the possibility that high-functioning autistic 
individuals may succeed on false belief tasks using abilities other than theory of 
mind. These possibilities are discussed in more detail in later sections in this 
Introduction. 
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1.5 Perceptual vs. Conceptual Perspective Taking. 
Baron-Cohen et al' s (1985) theory of mind hypothesis of autism predicts that autistic 
individuals' inability to ascertain another's point of view is limited to cognitive 
perspective taking. Although perceptual perspective taking (ascertaining what is in 
another's field of vision) also involves awareness of another's point of view, only 
cognitive perspective-taking requires inferences about the mental states of others. 
Therefore, individuals with autism should be as able as non-autistic people at tasks 
such as, for example, Piaget' s three mountains task (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). This 
task involves asking a child to say how a doll, placed in various positions, would 
view a three-dimensional display of three distinguishable mountains from different 
viewpoints. 
Reed & Peterson's (1990) carefully controlled study comparing cognitive and visual 
perspective taking in children with autism showed that, as predicted, they are not 
impaired in visual perspective-taking tasks. Children with autism are no different 
from children with learning disabilities or normal children in their ability to correctly 
judge what another person can see from a different position. However, the children 
were impaired on the cognitive perspective taking tasks despite relatively high verbal 
and chronological ages. The second level of cognitive perspective taking in this 
study had the same false belief question as classic I st order task ("Where will Sally 
look for her marble?") but higher processing demands with more characters and 
places to hide the marble. This could account for the small number of the able 
autistic participants who passed this cognitive perspective taking task (15%) and the 
difference in performance between tasks, as the perceptual perspective-taking tasks 
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in this study were much less demanding of information processing. However, Leslie 
& Frith (1988) also found preserved visual perspective taking in autistic children 
along with impaired cognitive perspective taking, using easier cognitive tasks. 
Dawson & Femald (1987) assessed the relationship between social behaviour and 
three types of perspective taking ability (perceptual, conceptual and affective) in 
autistic children. Of the three types, conceptual perspective-taking ability was found 
to be the most strongly related to social behaviour as measured by the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scales, although the combined score of perspective-taking ability 
was also significantly related to all of their social behaviour measures. 
One criticism of these fmdings of preserved visual perspective taking is that the 
visual tasks in these studies could only require the child to make the most basic level 
(zero order) representation of the physical state of the world but the cognitive 
perspective taking tasks required the next level of representation (1st order) of the 
world. Thus, differences could be due to the different reasoning demands the two 
types of task required, rather than a specific impairment in the attribution of mental 
states. 
There are some non-mental 1st order representations that are in everyday use: 
pictures, photographs and maps. Such non-mental representations have been shown 
to be understood by autistic children in tasks comparable to the Sally-Anne task 
(Leekam & Pemer, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Thus, it appears that autistic 
26 
individuals' inability to ascertain another's point of view is limited to cognitive 
perspective taking. 
1.6 Development of Theory of Mind 
Although much research has centred on the performance of autistic individuals on 
belief tasks, there is some evidence that the development of understanding of other 
mental states (e.g. desire, pretence, imagination, etc.) may also be delayed or 
abnormal in autism. 
Non-autistic children refer to such mental states as perception, desire, belief and 
emotion during the earliest stages of language development (Baron-Cohen, 1994). In 
the pre-school years, children develop an understanding that perception is pivotal to 
the acquisition of knowledge (Jane will know her coat is in the hall only if she saw or 
heard about its whereabouts) and plays a part in the acquisition of beliefs. They also 
develop an understanding that beliefs and desires together cause action ("Jane wants 
her coat and thinks it is in the wardrobe, so she goes to look for it there"), and 
emotions are caused in part by underlying desires and beliefs ("Jane is surprised 
when she looks in the wardrobe because she wants her coat and she thought it was 
there"). 
Young children's understanding of mental states appears to follow a three-stage 
model of development. Understanding of perception, pretence and imagination 
develops before understanding of desire and intention, which in turn are understood 
before knowledge and belief (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991). Similarly, understanding 
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that desires relate to emotions appears to come before understanding of how beliefs 
can cause emotion (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991 ). 
Baron-Cohen (1991) examined whether children with autism would also follow 
Gopnik & Slaughter's (1991) three-stage model of development of understanding of 
mental states. In contrast to normal children and children with learning disabilities, 
children with autism found imagination and pretence even more difficult to 
understand than desire, although belief was still the most difficult mental state to 
understand. Thus, children with autism appear to progress through a different 
sequence of mental state acquisition, as well as being delayed in comparison to non-
autistic children, and even in comparison to children of the same mental age (Baron-
Cohen, 1991). Theory of mind deficits in autistic individuals, therefore, are not 
limited to their understanding of belief. Even though autistic children may develop 
an understanding of some mental states, the effect of a delay in this acquisition 
would be disastrous for the development of normal reciprocal social interaction. 
Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) looked for evidence of a developmental progression of 
the understanding of belief by breaking down the elements of classic (I st order) false 
belief tasks into components of (hypothesised) increasing difficulty. They found 
90% of their young autistic participants showed a sequence of decreasing success on 
increasingly more difficult belief tasks, from the easiest Inferred Belief task (e.g. 
"This morning Jane saw her coloured pencils on the desk, not on the shelf. Now 
Jane wants her coloured pencils. Where will she look for them?") up to 2nd order 
false belief {the Ice Cream Van story). The researchers found that making the false 
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belief explicit by telling the child that the character holds a belief that is false, 
increased success on this task in comparison to the more classic 1st order "Smarties" 
task, where the false belief is inferred (67% and 53% respectively). As there was no 
non-autistic control group in this study, it cannot be said whether the developmental 
sequence in understanding belief found in this study is the same, delayed or deviant 
from normal development. 
1. 7 The Role of Age and Verbal Ability 
The majority of autistic individuals function within the range of learning disabilities 
and social deficits must be viewed within that context (Volkrnar & Klin, 1993). 
However, at the high-functioning end of the autistic spectrum, there are some 
individuals with verbal and other cognitive abilities within the average range. The 
influences of verbal ability and chronological age are briefly reviewed here. 
In Baron-Cohen et al's (1985) study, the 20% of autistic participants who passed the 
false belief task had verbal mental ages ranging from two years nine months to seven 
years. This was similar to the verbal mental ages of the autistic participants who 
failed the task. The Down's syndrome controls (the majority of whom passed the 
task) had lower verbal mental ages than the autistic participants and the "normal" 
controls (who also passed the task) had chronological ages lower than the autistic 
participants. Baron-Cohen et al (1985) therefore concluded that the theory of mind 
deficit seen in participants was independent of chronological age, poor verbal ability 
and general learning disabilities. 
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In a further study, Baron-Cohen (1991) found that mean chronological and verbal 
mental ages did not differ between autistic children who passed or failed a false 
belief task, but that both were factors influencing task success. 
Some researchers who have subsequently found, in comparison with Baron-Cohen et 
al's (1985) study, different proportions of autistic individuals successful at theory of 
mind tasks have tried to explain the variations in terms of chronological or verbal 
mental age differences and the developmental course of theory of mind ability. See 
Table 1.2 (pg. 21) for comparisons of chronological and verbal mental ages and 
proportions of autistic participants who pass theory of mind tasks across several 
different studies. 
Prior, Dahlstrom & Squires (1990) suggested that verbal ability may be central to the 
development or demonstration of theory of mind ability in autistic children. They 
found a relationship between verbal mental age and theory of mind task performance 
and suggested that a verbal mental age of at least six years was required for success 
on false belief tasks for children with autism, although this was not sufficient to 
ensure success. This was confounded with the fmding that chronological age was 
also related to success on theory of mind tasks, as no child under the age of eight 
years passed all the tasks. 
Leekam & Perner ( 1991) found that verbal mental age, but not chronological age or 
non-verbal mental age, distinguished autistic individuals who passed and failed 
theory of mind tasks. Bowler (1992) also found that only measures of verbal ability 
30 
were associated with the ability to justify 2"d order false belief responses in people 
with Asperger's syndrome. Leslie & Roth (1993) reviewed the evidence and 
suggested that the children with high-functioning autism who pass theory of mind 
tasks generally have a verbal mental age of over five years six months and a 
chronological age of eleven years or over, but that about half of autistic individuals 
who meet these criteria still fail theory of mind tasks. 
One of the main aims of Sparrevohn & Howie's (1995) study was to examine the 
influence of verbal ability on success on theory of mind tasks when confounding 
factors such as chronological age and non-verbal ability were controlled for. They 
matched participants on non-verbal mental age and mean chronological age and 
found that theory of mind success differed between groups separated on the basis of 
high and low verbal ability. Success on the 2nd order task was also more likely for 
the high verbal ability group, who all had verbal mental ages of seven years or above 
and a mean chronological age of eleven years four months. 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1991) used 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintilie, 1982) 
to estimate the level of verbal functioning of participants. This is a measure of 
receptive vocabulary only. Later empirical fmdings of the importance of verbal 
ability as a factor in theory of mind task success has made it desirable to include 
other measures of language ability (e.g. expressive ability) but few researchers have 
done so, mainly to aid comparison with Baron-Cohen's initial studies. 
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Fombonne, Siddons, Achard, Frith & Happe (1994) found that Verbal IQ was a 
significant factor influencing performance of social skills in everyday Jife that 
required mentalising ability and also performance on 1st order theory of mind tasks. 
Higher verbal ability was associated with success on theory of mind tasks, although 
only for the autistic participants. The verbal ability of normal and learning disabled 
children did not significantly influence theory of mind task performance. Higher 
verbal ability was also associated with more adaptive behaviour in everyday life 
(Fombonne et al, 1994). 
1.8 Theory of Mind and Social Skills. 
There is evidence that social skills in autistic individuals are abnormal for both their 
chronological age and mental age level (Loveland and Kelly, 1988). Volkmar, 
Bregman, Cohen, Hooks & Stevenson (1989) used predictive equations based on the 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales standardisation data and found that deficits in 
social skills in autism were only partially explained by mental age alone; another 
factor was influencing the severe social impairments in autism. Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al, 1985) would hypothesise that the other 
influencing factor was theory of mind ability. 
The theory of mind deficit account of autism makes specific predictions about which 
social skills will be impaired in autistic individuals. A deficit in the ability to think 
about thoughts should reveal itself in everyday life as social impairment, although 
only those social skills that require the ability to understand and represent mental 
states will be impaired (Baron-Cohen, 1988). Social skills that can be learned or 
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successfully performed without theory of mind ability will not be influenced by 
theory of mind deficits. Thus, responding to hints and indirect cues in conversation 
requires the ability to understand another's mental state and should be impaired in 
autistic individuals, whereas taking turns while playing games could be achieved 
through rote learning of a simple rule or social learning. Although having theory of 
mind ability presumably may make this task easier, a deficit in theory of mind ability 
should not prevent autistic individuals showing this social behaviour. Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie and Frith ( 1985) suggested that the small number of autistic children who pass 
theory of mind tests would show a different pattern of social impairments than the 
majority who fail such tests. 
The pattern of social skills and deficits as predicted by Baron-Cohen et al (1985) has 
been found in normal pre-school children. Lalonde and Chandler (1995) looked for 
correlations between theory of mind performance and everyday social skills in 
normal three-year-olds. They found that social skills governed by simple rules or 
social convention (e.g. responding appropriately when introduced to a stranger) did 
not correlate with a child's attainment of 1st order theory of mind. However, social 
skills which were not easily governed by a simple set of rules, but which require a 
measure of insight into others' mental states (e.g. playing with a group of peers in co-
operative activity without supervision) did positively correlate with a child's theory 
of mind ability. Those children who had already developed theory of mind ability at 
age three were more likely to show social skills requiring such insight than those 
children who did not pass theory of mind tasks. 
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However, only eight out of a possible forty items in Lalonde & Chandler's (1995) 
study correlated positively and significantly with theory of mind ability in this group 
of young normal children. This complements the findings of Frith, Happe and 
Siddons (1994), who found that theory of mind was not a good predictor of everyday 
social adaptation in normal and learning disabled children. Normal three-year-olds 
who fail false belief tasks do not entirely lack the ability to understand mental states: 
they can understand true beliefs (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988), can use mental state 
terms correctly (Baron-Cohen, 1994) and can pass non-standard theory of mind tasks 
(Wellman, 1993). Such abilities, precursors to the ability to understand false belief, 
will facilitate social functioning in normal children. Relationships between theory of 
mind and social skills in normal children will be confounded by the apparently 
continuous developmental progress in elements of theory of mind ability. 
Frith, Happe and Siddons (1994) examined the pattern of social skills and deficits in 
autism using a different, "top-down" methodology, by identifying and expanding on 
items of the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales that appear to rely upon theory of 
mind ability. These items were identified from theoretical hypotheses and the ratings 
of undergraduate students. In the same way, these items were distinguished from 
examples of social behaviour that seemed possible without the understanding of 
mental states. Frith et al (1994) explored the relationship between these two groups 
of everyday social behaviours and performance on 1st order theory of mind tests. 
They found that only those autistic children who passed theory of mind tasks showed 
social behaviour that necessitated theory of mind, in contrast to the learning disabled 
and normal controls. Autistic children who failed the theory of mind tasks showed 
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little evidence of understanding mental states in their everyday lives. In comparison, 
young normal and learning disabled children did not differ on any variable in relation 
to theory of mind performance - even those who failed theory of mind tasks still 
showed evidence of theory of mind ability in everyday life. This suggests that theory 
of mind ability alone is insufficient to pass theory of mind tasks, or that theory of 
mind tasks are not reliable tests of theory of mind ability. 
There was remarkable dissimilarity between the items of behaviour Frith et al ( 1994) 
and Lalonde and Chandler ( 1995) judged to be associated with theory of mind 
ability. Of the sixteen items Frith et al ( 1994) rated as being strongly associated with 
theory of mind ability, only one of those items was correlated with success on theory 
of mind tasks in the young normal children in Lalonde and Chandler's (1995) study. 
Although drawn from the same large initial pool of items (the Vineland Adaptive 
Behavior Scales), there was little overlap between the two studies' sets of behaviours 
that were hypothesised to require theory of mind ability. 
Unremarkably, the sets of behaviours not requiring theory of mind ability, which 
were a large proportion of the total set of Vineland items, were fairly similar (38% 
concordance). However, two items directly contradicted each other. Playing board 
games was significantly correlated with success on theory of mind tasks in Lalonde 
& Chandler's (I 995) study, whereas Frith et al's (I 994) raters judged that playing 
simple board games did not necessitate theory of mind ability. More significantly, 
Frith et al (1994) judged that "apologising for hurting another's feelings" required 
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theory of mind, yet no correlation was found between these in Lalonde & Chandler's 
( 1995) young normal sample. 
Frith et al (1994) did not report which and how many individual items were 
significantly and positively correlated with theory of mind performance and so direct 
comparisons between these two studies cannot be made. However, the differences in 
the items included in the mentalist sets of social behaviour are indicative of the 
difficulty in judging which social skills unequivocally require theory of mind ability. 
Frith et al (1994) also identified two groups of autistic participants who passed 
theory of mind tasks but differed in the amount of everyday mentalist social 
behaviours they performed. One group more frequently showed those social 
behaviours that seemed to require theory of mind ability, whereas the other group 
were no different from those who failed theory of mind tasks in demonstrating 
evidence of mentalising abilities in everyday social skills. Frith et al ( 1994) 
concluded that there is evidence of both theory of mind ability and logical, non-
theory of mind strategies in use in the autistic population aiding performance in 
social situations. This has been replicated in cross-cultural studies with French 
children, adolescents and young adults with autistic-spectrum disorders (Fombonne, 
Siddons, Achard, Frith & Happe, 1994; Hughes, Soares-Boucaud, Hochmann & 
Frith, 1997). 
The autistic children who passed theory of mind tasks in Frith and colleagues studies 
(Frith et al, 1994; Fombonne et al, 1994; Hughes et al, 1997) were socially impaired 
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in comparison to the non-autistic population despite their ability to solve such tasks. 
This indicates that having a theory of mind, for children with autism at least, does not 
protect against social impairment. It is possible that these children possess 
mentalising skills but fail to apply this knowledge when appropriate, and thus remain 
socially impaired (Bowler, 1992). 
Alternatively, theory of mind task success could be due to mechanisms other than 
mentalising ability, such as ·logical reasoning skills, which are used to by-pass the 
lack of theory of mind. Such strategies are likely to be less flexible and slower than 
using the more appropriate theory of mind ability. A child with autism who used 
general strategies, less specific than theory of mind, to solve 1st or 2"d order tasks 
would remain socially impaired as such strategies would be cumbersome to use in 
everyday social situations (Bowler, 1992). 
These two possibilities, that (i) theory of mind task success could be due to 
mechanisms other than mentalising ability and that (ii) it is a failure in performance 
rather than ability that characterises the relationship between theory of mind task 
success and social deficits in autism, are discussed in the following sections. 
1.9 Strategies for Passing Theory of Mind Tasks 
A significant number of individuals with autistic-spectrum disorders are able to pass 
theory of mind tasks. Baron-Cohen et al ( 1985) suggested that, if a deficit in theory 
of mind is behind failure in social situations, the small number of autistic children 
who pass theory of mind tests would show a different pattern of social impairments 
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than the majority who fail such tests. There does seem to be some evidence that 
children who pass theory of mind tasks are more likely to show social skills that 
require mentalising ability (Fombonne et al, 1994; Frith et al, 1994; Hughes et al, 
1997). 
However, success on theory of mind tasks, rather than indicating the use of theory of 
mind ability, could also be due to autistic individuals using logical mechanisms to 
circumvent their lack of intuitive knowledge of social behaviour. The data from 
Frith et al (1994) and Bowler (1992), where theory of mind task success co-existed 
with severe social impairment, are consistent with this suggestion. 
Bowler (1992) suggested that the form and wording of classic theory of mind tasks 
may influence task success. For example, features of the Ice Cream Van story 
appear to direct individuals to use non-mentalist strategies to solve the task. The 
majority of Bowler's (1992) participants, autistic and non-autistic controls alike, 
gave justifications for their responses that referred to the point in the story when the 
false belief is established (when the ice cream man explicitly changes his mind about 
where he will sell his ice cream). This pivotal point in the story is explicitly stated 
in the narration and this appears to cue individuals trying to solve the task to use 
justifications that refer to this point. Thus, non-mentalist strategies are just as 
appropriate as mentalist when solving this task and are actually encouraged by the 
form of the story. 
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This could explain why Bowler's (1992) autistic participants were not impaired on 
this task in comparison to non-autistic controls: the controls, who presumably would 
use mentalist strategies in everyday life when dealing with other people's beliefs, 
were cued in to using the non-mentalist strategies that autistic people would normally 
use. As both mentalist and non-mentalist strategies can be used to solve the Ice 
Cream Van task, the autistic participants were not differentially impaired on this 
task. However, the non-mentalist strategies are a disadvantage in everyday life when 
dealing with the mental lives of other people and thus the autistic individuals who 
passed this task remained socially impaired in everyday life. 
In part to address the issue of whether the form of the task can influence the results, 
Happe (1994) developed a set of vignettes designed to be more naturalistic tests of 
theory of mind abilities than the classic theory of mind tasks. The "Strange Stories" 
describe everyday situations where characters say things that are not meant literally. 
The aim of the "Strange Stories" task is to describe the characters' intentions or 
motivations and in this way are related to theory of mind. 
Happe (1994) compared eighteen autistic adults' and children's performance on 
standard theory of mind tests with performance on the set of "Strange Stories". In 
addition to a comprehension test question, the Strange Stories also ask the participant 
to provide a justification for their answer, thus allowing closer inspection of the 
strategies used by autistic individuals to solve theory of mind tasks. Happe ( 1994) 
found that performance on the Strange Stories was closely related to performance on 
standard theory of mind tests, but that the Strange Stories enhanced the detection of 
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impairments in mentalising ability as the ability to provide mental state explanations 
for people's behaviour could be examined. The autistic participants did not differ 
from the learning disabled and normal control groups in the use of mental states in 
their answers, but their responses were less appropriate and less accurate in the 
context. 
Happe (1994) found evidence in the Justification responses of individuals with 
autism who seemed to be using non-mentalist strategies to answer the problem of 
characters' intentions. Several autistic participants tended to use just one or two 
mental state justifications repeatedly, possibly indicating that they had rote learned 
one or two explanations for situations when people say things they do not understand 
and applied them without any real understanding of the m~ntal state terms. 
In his study looking at teaching false belief to children with autism, Swettenham 
(1996) also found evidence consistent with the idea that the autistic children can 
learn to use non-mentalistic strategies to solve the false belief tasks. Following 
instruction, the children could pass false belief tasks similar in format to the ones 
used in the teaching, but could not generalise this success to false belief tasks 
different in format, although normal three-year-olds and children with Down's 
Syndrome could do so. 
Leslie & Roth (1993) made the suggestion that success on theory of mind tasks for 
people with autism may be an indication of the use of strategies that have developed 
to compensate for a theory of mind dysfunction. These compensatory strategies may 
be based in other types of reasoning that remain intact in autism. Theory of mind, 
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when it works, is fast and spontaneous and (possibly) innate and develops before the 
higher order logical reasoning which would be required for a successful 
compensatory ability and hence the delay of evidence of mentalising ability in 
children with autism. 
Leslie & Roth ( 1993) propose that one possible way for autistic children to 
compensate for a lack of theory of mind ability is to use a strategy based on the rules 
of language. Some language structures appear to be specifically 'designed' for 
conveying information about mental states (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). For example, 
mental state terms are often embedded in syntactic structures that Leslie & Roth 
(1993) suggest can be used as cues to the underlying mental concept encoded in the 
mental-state verb. Leslie & Roth ( 1993) acknowledge the complexity of this strategy 
as a compensation for a lack of intuitive understanding of mental states and the 
requirement for high level general reasoning abilities to be intact. 
1.10 Central Coherence 
Bowler ( 1992) suggested that the co-existence of social deficits and success on 
theory of mind tasks could be explained by autistic participants' failure to apply the 
knowledge they had of mental states in the relevant social situations. Frith ( 1989a) 
has proposed a hypothesis that could explain this failure to see the relevance of 
knowledge to particular problems: weak central coherence. 
Frith ( 1989a) suggested that individuals with autism are uniquely unable to integrate 
information at different levels of meaning, and that this is the cognitive deficit 
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underlying autistic spectrum disorders. During normal information processing, an 
individual draws together disparate pieces of information to form a higher-level, 
contextually appropriate Gestalt. This process Frith (1989a) labelled the "drive for 
central coherence". For example, a familiar person's face can be brought to mind, 
described and recognised, but the exact colour of their eyes and the shape of their 
nose are a struggle or impossible to recall. Frith (1989a) suggested that a lack of 
central coherence could explain the pattern of abilities and deficits seen in autistic 
individuals. Free from the need to process information in context, individuals with 
autistic spectrum disorders would have the advantage when attention to detail (local 
information) was required, but would be disadvantaged when the processing of 
global meaning was necessary (Frith, 1989). 
There are some experimental findings that appear to support the central coherence 
theory of autism. Autistic individuals show consistently superior performance on the 
Block Design subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales relative to their mean non-
verbal performance, and sometimes relative to their non-autistic peers (e.g. Ehlers, 
Nyden, Gillberg, Sandberg, Dahlgren, Hjelmquist & Oden, 1997). The subtest 
requires the construction of a design using individual blocks, the strong Gestalt 
qualities of the original designs making it difficult to mentally separate the design 
into separate blocks for reconstruction. The central coherence theory predicts that 
individuals with autistic spectrum disorders would not benefit from pre-segmentation 
of the designs due to their specific ability to discern parts over whales, whereas non-
autistic people would benefit from such pre-segmentation. Shah & Frith (1993) 
found just this pattern of results when they presented autistic and non-autistic 
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children with block designs that had either intact or pre-segmented models. The 
autistic children only showed superior performance compared to controls when 
working from intact models. 
Weeks & Hobson (1987) found that children with autism, when given a free choice, 
sorted photographs of faces by type of hat, whereas the non-autistic controls sorted 
by facial expression. Many of the autistic participants could sort by facial expression 
when asked, indicating that we_ak central coherence influences the preferred 
processing style (subconsciously), rather than blocking all ability to process globally. 
If a weak central coherence is more appropriately perceived as a preferred 
processing style rather than a cognitive impairment, then weak central coherence 
may not be specific to autistic spectrum disorders. Jarrold & Russell (I 997) 
examined this possibility using a task requiring autistic, learning disabled and normal 
children to count and remember the numbers of dots on a series of cards. The dots 
were presented in a random pattern or in patterns as on a die. Children with autism 
appeared to receive no benefit from the global pattern of dots in die form, performing 
equally well in both types of presentation, unlike the controls who counted random 
dot patterns more slowly. However, the failure to count globally was not specific to 
the autistic participants, as about one-third of the learning disabled controls also 
failed to do so. As all the participants in this study were matched for verbal ability 
but not non-verbal or visuo-spatial ability, it is difficult to discern whether this result 
is a reflection of a processing style that is associated with learning disabilities, vi suo-
spatial ability or autism. 
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The central coherence theory also predicts that autistic individuals would be 
specifically disadvantaged where task demands involve the processing of individual 
items in context (global meaning). Happe (1997) examined autistic children and 
adults on a test of homograph reading. Homographs are words that are spelled the 
same but pronounced differently depending on the context: I told her where I live~ 
The band performed live. As the processing of the whole context is required to 
pronounce these words correctly, central coherence theory predicts that autistic 
individuals will be specifically impaired in this task. Happe ( 1997) found that the 
autistic participants ofthis study did not show evidence of using the global context to 
find the correct pronunciation of the individual homographs, unlike the non-autistic 
controls. 
Happe ( 1997) also compared performance on the homograph task across different 
levels of theory of mind ability. The effect of weak central coherence was 
independent of theory of mind performance - even some of the participants who 
were successful on I st order or 2"d order theory of mind tasks failed to use the context 
to produce the correct homograph pronunciation. Happe ( 1997) concluded "a deficit 
in central coherence can coexist with a degree of theory of mind task competence". 
This means it is unlikely that a theory of mind deficit is a by-product of weak central 
coherence. 
It is only relatively recently that Frith's ( 1989) weak central coherence theory has 
been tested empirically and there are therefore no validated or reliable tests of central 
coherence in the literature. No empirical testing of this theory has yet been carried 
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out with reference to social behaviour. It therefore remains unclear how central 
coherence relates to everyday social behaviour in children with autism. 
1.11 Social Reasoning 
Social reasoning can be defined as that part of cognition concerned with people, their 
actions and adaptive social functioning (Herbert, 1991) and can refer to 
understanding of different social rules which apply in different social situations 
(Beveridge & Conti-Ramsden, 1987). Acquiring knowledge about the social world 
involves interaction with actions of others. Social reasoning, the process of 
constructing knowledge about social processes, occurs within a network of 
relationships and interactions (Durkin, 1988). 
Children's experiences in a wide range of contexts forms the basis from which social 
knowledge and social skills develop. The early relationship with primary caregiver, 
the interactions and routines of that relationship, have an important role in the 
development of knowledge about general social interactions (Beveridge & Conti-
Ramsden, 1987). Parents continue to influence the acquisition of social knowledge 
by encouraging social experiences and by giving cues about subtle rules of 
interactions in new contexts. Once children attend pre-school or school, new rules 
about the dealing with peers need to be acquired for successful integration. As 
parents have little influence in these contexts, it appears that the interactions with 
peers in themselves are used to build knowledge about such interactions (Beveridge 
& Conti-Ramsden, 1987). For children even without any handicapping conditions, 
the development of social reasoning skills is a long and difficult process, with no 
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guarantees for success (Lloyd & Beveridge, 1981 ). For children with autism, it is 
likely to be a near impossible task to develop unimpaired social reasoning skills. The 
early social interactions of autistic children are not ideal for the task of extending 
their social reasoning abilities. The problems reviewed earlier (section 1.3) in joint 
attention and social referencing skills in young children with autism will hamper 
their ability to learn about social situations from their parents, which has a 
cumulative affect throughout development of social reasoning. 
Social reasoning skills therefore have a wide impact on the development of adaptive 
social behaviour. Proponents of the theory of mind deficit account of autism have 
suggested that the ability to attribute mental states is one part of general social 
reasoning but separable from it or logical, non-social reasoning (e.g. Leslie & Thai ss, 
1992; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996). 
There are some experimental findings that appear to support this claim. Scott & 
Baron-Cohen ( 1996) found that children with autism were able to successfully solve 
two types of logical reasoning task yet were impaired in their ability to reason about 
mental states. Leslie & Thai ss ( 1992) found evidence that children with autism were 
able to reason about non-mental representations of the real world (e.g. photographs) 
but were impaired in their ability to reason about mental representations of the world 
(e.g. beliefs). However, Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto & Frye (1996) argued that the 
positive correlation they found between performance on theory of mind tasks and a 
test of non-social rule use suggested that general reasoning constraints were 
underlying difficulties with theory of mind. 
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Klin, Volkmar & Sparrow {1992) found that social deficits in autistic children 
included behaviours that are normally present in non-autistic infants before the time 
at which theory of mind skills are thought to develop. Their data were consistent 
with the suggestion that social impairments in autism occur early in social 
development and are therefore likely to be related to general social reasoning deficits 
rather than theory of mind. 
1.12 Summary 
High-functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome are closely related on the autistic 
spectrum, and share impairments in social behaviours as central to the disorders. The 
social impairments seen are not necessarily exclusive to autism, but the pattern of 
social deficits and preserved abilities runs through the autistic spectrum. The theory 
of mind hypothesis (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al, 1985) suggests that a deficit in this 
ability is underlying social impairments in autism. In a series of experiments, Baron-
Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989b; Baron-
Cohen, 1991; Holroyd and Baron-Cohen, 1993) have demonstrated that a large 
proportion of children with autism are both deviant and delayed in the development 
of an understanding of mental states. There is some evidence that deficits in theory 
of mind vary across the autistic spectrum. Both chronological age and verbal ability 
influence success or failure on theory of mind tasks. Use of alternative strategies, 
general social reasoning deficits and weak central coherence have also been proposed 
to influence theory of mind task performance (e.g. Happe, 1994) and theory of mind 
abilities in everyday life (e.g. Frith, 1989). There is some empirical evidence that 
certain social skills are strongly related to theory of mind ability (Lalonde and 
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Chandler, 1995), and that these social skills alone are missing from the repertoire of 
autistic children who fail theory of mind tasks (Frith, Happe & Siddons, I 994). 
However, the presence of mentalist social skills can vary even amongst those 
children with autistic spectrum disorders who can succeed on theory of mind tasks 
(Frith et al, 1994 ). 
The broad research goals of the current study are therefore to examine further the 
link between theory of mind task performance and everyday social behaviour by 
including tasks that will allow more detailed examination of strategies being used by 
children with high-functioning autism and a measure of general social reasoning 
ability. 
1.13 Aims of Current Study 
One of the aims of the current study was to replicate the findings of Bowler ( 1992) 
and others (e.g. Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995) of theory of mind task success in 
children with autistic spectrum disorders. The children's justifications for their 
responses to the false belief questions of the tasks were of special interest, as these 
justifications were to be examined for evidence of the reasoning underlying the 
responses. In particular, evidence of mental state reasoning in those children who 
pass theory of mind tasks was of interest. 
A second aim was to compare performance on classic theory of mind tasks with 
more naturalistic tasks of mentalising ability. An association between the 
performance on the two types of task would suggest that related abilities are required 
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to accomplish both (Happe, 1994). In particular, the responses the autistic children 
gave to justify story characters' actions were to be examined for evidence of mental 
state reasoning or other reasoning strategies and compared to responses to classic 
theory of mind tasks. 
A third aim of the current study was to examine the relationship between general 
social reasoning and theory of mind ability. A positive association between the two 
different reasoning tasks woul9 be consistent with the suggestion that impairments in 
theory of mind are not restricted to the understanding of mental states, but derive 
from general social reasoning limitations (Zelazo et al, 1996). If the social reasoning 
task used in this study is a measure of a more general social reasoning ability that 
underlies theory of mind, then if a child is at a pre-reasoning stage of development, 
that child should not be able to solve theory of mind tasks. If any child could solve 
theory of mind tasks yet not demonstrate social reasoning, this would be inconsistent 
with the suggestion that a general reasoning difficulty underlies theory of mind. 
One of the main aims of the current study was to replicate and extend the fmdings of 
Lalonde & Chandler (1995) and Frith et al (1994): to find a relationship between 
theory of mind task performance and everyday mentalising ability and to discover 
which social skills of children with autism are related to attaining I st order or 2nd 
order theory of mind ability. In addition, to fmd evidence of at least two different 
groups oftheory of mind 'passers' as Frith et al (1994) described: some children who 
pass theory of mind tasks will show similar (infrequent) mentalising ability in 
everyday life to those who fail theory of mind tasks. The second group will show 
moderate to high levels of mentalist social skills. 
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A further aim was to examine the relationship between everyday social skills and the 
use of mental state terms when reasoning about social behaviour by examining 
autistic children's use of mental state terms in naturalistic theory of mind tasks and 
social reasoning tasks. This would provide an opportunity to examine responses to 
such tasks for evidence of insight or understanding of mental state terms used. It 
would be possible for children to use mental state terms without showing mentalist 
social skills if a compensatory strategy had been learned. 
1.14 Hypotheses 
A. Theory of Mind and Strange Stories 
A.1. Performance on classic theory of mind tasks will be correlated with the use of 
mental state terms in Justification responses in the Strange Stories. 
A.2. Children in the no theory of mind group will not use mental state terms in 
Justifications in the Strange Stories. 
A. 3. Only children with 1st or 2"d order theory of mind ability will use mental state 
terms in Justifications. 
A.4. Children with 2"d order ability will use more mental state terms tn 
Justification than children in the 1st order group. 
B. Theory of Mind and Social Reasoning 
B.l. Performance on classic theory of mind tasks will be related to social 
reasoning ability. 
B.2. Children with pre-reasoning social reasoning skills will not demonstrate 
theory of mind ability. 
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B.3. No child who passes theory of mind tasks will be at the pre-reasoning stage 
of social reasoning. 
BA. Children with I st order theory of mind ability will have Level I social 
reasoning ability ("immediate consequences"). 
B.S. Children with 2nd order theory of mind ability will show Level 2 or higher 
social reasoning skills (at least "partial reasoning" ability). 
B.6. Only children with I st order theory of mind ability or higher will identify or 
use themes relating to. emotions (I st order mental states) in responses to social 
reasoning questions. 
B. 7. Only children with 2nd order theory of mind ability will identify or use 2nd 
order mental states or elaborations in responses to social reasoning questions. 
B.8. There will be no differences between the theory of mind groups on 
identification and use of physical states, value judgements and rules in 
responses to social reasoning questions. 
C. Theory of Mind and Social Skills (see Appendix I) 
C. I. Children who fail theory of mind tasks will show no evidence of using 
mentalist social skills in everyday life. 
C.2. Only children with I st order theory of mind ability or higher will show 
evidence of mentalist social skills in everyday life. 
C.3. Only children with 2nd order theory of mind ability will show evidence of 
mentalist social skills requiring 2nd order theory of mind ability. 
CA. There will be no differences between the theory of mind groups 1n 
performance of non-mentalist social skills. 
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D. Strange Stories and Social Skills (see Appendix I) 
D. I. The use of mental state terms in Justification responses will be associated 
with use of mentalist social skills in everyday life. 
D.2. Only children who use mental state terms in Justification responses will show 
mentalist social skills in everyday life. 
D.3. There will be no difference between those children who do and do not use 
mental state terms in performance of non-mentalist social skills. 
E. Social Reasoning and Social Skills (see Appendix I) 
E. I. The identification and use of mental states in responses to social reasoning 
questions will be associated with the performance of mentalist social skills in 
everyday life. 
E.2. Only children who identify and use I st order or 2nd order mental states in 
social reasoning responses will show mentalist social skills. 
E.3. Only children who identify and use 2nd order mental states in social reasoning 
responses will perform 2nd order mentalist social skills. 
E.4. There will be no difference between those who do or do not use or identify 
mental states in social reasoning responses in performance of non-mentalist 
social skills. 
F. Chronological and Verbal Mental Ages 
F. I. There will be no significant differences in mean chronological age between 
groups separated on the basis of performance on theory of mind tasks, the 
Strange Stories and social reasoning tasks. 
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F.2. As the participants have been pre-selected to have a minimum level of verbal 
ability, there will be no significant differences in mean verbal mental age 
between groups separated on the basis of performance on theory of mind 
tasks, the Strange Stories and social reasoning tasks. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
2.1 Design 
Children with autistic spectrum disorders were separated into groups on the basis of 
(i) performance on classic 1st order and 2"d order theory of mind tasks, (ii) 
performance on a social reasoning task and (iii) the use of mental state terms in 
Justifications to the "Strange Stories". The pattern of everyday social skills was 
compared across each category of groups in unrelated designs. Performances on 
each of the three main types of task (theory of mind; social reasoning; Strange 
Stories) were also compared across respective group conditions in unrelated designs. 
Qualitative analyses of participants' responses to (i) classic 1st order and 2"d order 
theory of mind tasks, (ii) the social reasoning task and (iii) the "Strange Stories" 
were made with reference to everyday social behaviour and performance on the 
respective tasks. 
2.2 Participants 
The participants were either current or past patients of one of two child and family 
mental health departments. The children and their parents participated voluntarily in 
this study. For the majority of participants, the reason for initial contact with the 
psychology or psychiatry departments was for diagnostic assessment. The children 
had been diagnosed with high-functioning autism or Asperger's Syndrome by 
experienced clinicians. Criteria for inclusion in this study were: 
I. children between the ages of eight and seventeen, 
2. with a diagnosis of high-functioning autism or Asperger's Syndrome, 
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3. with an estimated verbal ability of at least five years of age. 
4. In addition, the child could not have a eo-morbid diagnosis of Tourette's or 
Attention Deficit Disorder. 
A minimum age of eight was set as the majority of non-autistic children can 
successfully complete 2"d order theory of mind tasks by this age. This would exclude 
failure at any level of theory of mind ability by autistic children being due to normal 
developmental processes. 
A wide age range provided the opportunity to examine developmental trends across 
the participants, but a maximum age of seventeen was set to ensure a balance 
between that and the desire to examine the social abilities of children only. Social 
context and experience have a significant impact on social behaviour. As all of the 
participants were in mainstream schools, at age seventeen their lifestyles and main 
occupations were still school-age based. Additionally, the age range reflected the 
standardisation range of the measures used. 
Each child's verbal ability was initially estimated by their consultant to be at least 
five years of age. This was to exclude the possibility of general learning disability or 
lack of comprehension of the task as a reason for failure. 
Using the above criteria, 28 children were identified and contacted by letter (see 
Appendix 2), and where possible by their consultant, to inform them of the study (see 
Appendix 3) and to ask for their participation. Parents and children who initially 
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expressed interest in the study in response to the letter, were given the opportunity to 
gather more information about the study either by telephone or face to face contact. 
Assessment proceeded only after the informed consent of both parents and child was 
received. The children were assessed in an environment of their choice that was 
familiar to them- the majority were seen at home and some were seen at school. 
2.3 Materials 
1st Order Theory of Mind 
Sally-Anne Test (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985). This false belief task, a version of the 
task devised by Wimmer & Perner (1983), examines 1st order theory of mind ability. 
Two easily distinguishable hand puppets, a round red box, a square blue box (both 
boxes with lids), and a large marble were used to act out the scenario as described in 
Baron-Cohen et al (1985). One small change was made from the original procedure 
-one puppet was dressed as a boy and was therefore called Andy instead of Anne. 
See Figure 2.2 in Procedure section below. 
"Smarties" Test (Perner et al, 1989). This is also a 1st order false belief task. An 
empty tube of "Smarties" and two colour pencils were used to act out this scenario 
(see Procedure section below). 
2nd Order Theory of Mind 
Ice Cream Van Story (Baron-Cohen, 1989b). This story, adapted by Baron-Cohen 
( 1989b) from Pemer & Wimmer' s ( 1985) procedure, was designed to elicit evidence 
of 2nd order theory of mind ability. The story takes place in a toy village with a 
church, two houses, a park bench and Lego trees to prevent the characters 'seeing' 
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the church or John's house from the park, four Mobile people and a Lego ice cream 
van (see Figure 2.1 and Appendix 4). 
Birthday Puppy Story (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994). This 2nd order false belief 
story was developed to have lower information-processing demands than the Ice 
Cream Van Story above, as the authors hypothesised that the added information-
processing load of 2nd order tasks (in comparison to 1st order tasks) was the cause of 
autistic children's failure on these tasks. Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan ( 1994b) 
reported a larger proportion of their participants who passed a 1st order task also 
passed this 2nd order task. This form of 2nd order task appears to facilitate autistic 
children's success at 2nd order attribution in comparison to the Baron-Cohen ( 1989b) 
task. See Appendix 5. 
"Naturalistic" Theory of Mind 
Strange Stories (Happe, 1994). The Strange Stories were developed to be more 
naturalistic tasks than classic theory of mind tests. The set of Strange Stories consists 
of 24 short stories about everyday situations where people say things they do not 
mean literally. Each story is accompanied by a picture and a comprehension 
question, "Was it true, what X said?" and a justification question, "Why did X say 
that?" There are 12 types of story, comprising Pretend, Lie, Joke, White Lie, Idiom, 
Misunderstanding, Double Bluff, Sarcasm, Persuasion, Contrary Emotion, 
Appearance/Reality and Forget (see Appendix 6 for the stories used in the current 
study). The scoring system used in Happe (1994) was followed, which classified 
each answer as appropriate or incorrect, and as concerning psychological/mental 
states or physical states. This last score was used in this study as a reflection of 
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social reasoning ability. Each child was given credit only for his/her 'best' answer 
when scoring each story. Despite the subjective judgements required to score the 
justifications, reliability has been reported to be high (Happe, 1994). 
Social Reasoning 
Social Reasoning (Elliott, Murray and Pearson, 1978). This is a subtest of the 
British Ability Scales (BAS), which was standardised on the data from 3435 British 
children. The social reasoning subtest was designed to be used to estimate 
developmental stages in social reasoning. Responses are scored according to 5 levels 
of reasoning ability: pre-reasoning, immediate consequences, partial evaluation, full 
evaluation and generalised comment (see Table 2.1 ). The estimated developmental 
stage for the child is the median of the item scores. The apparent subjectiveness of 
rating responses on this test is tempered by extensive descriptions and examples as 
guidance. This is standardised and validated for British children from age 5 to 171h. 
years. See Appendix 7. 
Table 2.1 The five developmental stages of social reasoning from the British Ability Scales. 
DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS 
Pre-Reasoning Child unable to comprehend what is required or provide 
a relevant response. 
Immediate Consequences Relevant responses in terms of immediate reactions or 
consequences; focus on punishment/reward of one 
person only. No further elaboration 
Partial Evaluation Broader grasp of one side of the problem only; value 
judgements; statements of simple rules of behaviour; no 
view of both sides of story. 
Full Evaluation Reasons and explanations for the actions of both 
characters; some value judgements but with reference to 
all sides; may provide elaboration. 
Generalised Comment Child sees the problem as an example of general 




Vine/and Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow et a/, 1984). This measure of social 
behaviour has the advantage of being standardised and validated for non-
handicapped and handicapped populations, as well as being perhaps the most widely 
used assessment tool in studies of socialisation. Only the Socialisation Domain of 
the Interview Edition: Expanded Form was administered in this study (see Appendix 
8). This contains 134 items designed to assess strengths and weaknesses across a 
wide range of social behaviours. Internal consistency reliability for the Socialisation 
Domain of the Expanded Form ranges from 0.88 to 0.97, and from 0.84 to 0.86 for 
the Interpersonal Relationships, Play and Leisure Time and Coping Skills 
subdomains of the Socialisation Domain (Sparrow et al, 1984). Test-retest reliability 
coefficients fall in the range of 0.80 to 0. 92 (Sparrow et al, 1984). Further analyses 
have demonstrated that the Vineland is a valid instrument in terms of face, content, 
predictive and construct validity (Sparrow et al, 1984). 
Each item on the scale can be rated from 0 to 2. A score of 0 is given if the 
individual rarely or never performs the behaviour (even if they can), 1 indicates that 
the behaviour is sometimes or partially performed, and 2 indicates that the behaviour 
is (or has been at the appropriate age) regularly and adequately performed. The 
question is whether the individual does perform the behaviour rather than if they can 
do the behaviour. 
In addition to the standard method of using the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, 
social skills items which only appeared possible if an understanding of mental states 
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was present were identified, as well as clusters which seemed possible without such 
understanding. Very strict criteria were given to the clinicians who were rating the 
items: if any other way apart from using a theory of mind skill could potentially be 
used to successfully perform a social skill (e.g. rote learning, conditioned response), 
it was not included in the mentalist set. Inter-rater agreement for the mentalist social 
skills was 88%. A set of sixteen mentalist items was thus formed and 23 clusters of 
non-mentalist social skills. Three of the sixteen mentalist social skills items were 
rated (1 00% agreement) as r~quiring 2"d order mental state understanding. These 
three sets of behaviours are shown in Appendix I. 
Verbal Ability 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn et al, 1982) is a measure of receptive 
vocabulary and not a measure of general intelligence. It has been standardised on a 
British sample of 3334 school children between three and nineteen years, using the 
Short Form version of the test. The Short Form comprises 32 items whose internal 
reliability ranges from 0. 75 to 0.86 (Dunn et al, 1982). The are no direct test-retest 
measures of reliability of the scale, but the standardised score is given as an 
equivalent age point and range defined by the standard error of measurement. The 
participants were assessed with this measure to ensure they had a sufficient level of 
language ability to understand the demands of the experimental tasks. 
Diagnostic Screening 
Asperger 's Checklist (Ehlers & Gillberg, 1993). This screening questionnaire 1s 
used to identify children at risk for Asperger syndrome (see Appendix 9). It has a 
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low cut-off point to minimise the chance of missing true positives,. which means 
there is a higher chance of false positives. It is recommended that a second stage of 
comprehensive clinical assessment is employed to increase the validity of any 
diagnosis. Further assessment would be recommended for any child with a total 
score ~5, or a score ~3 on 16 items considered most characteristic of Asperger 
Syndrome. Thus, a total score of 9-24 indicates a possible diagnosis of Asperger 
Syndrome, and a score ~25 an almost definite diagnosis. However, it was not being 
used as a diagnostic aid in this study, only as a measure of homogeneity of symptoms 
across the participants. For these purposes, the questionnaire has good levels of 
reliability (Ehlers & Gillberg, I 993). 
2.4 Procedure 
Prior to commencing the study, ethical approval was sought and obtained from both 
the Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics and the Lothian Research Ethics 
Psychiatry/Clinical Psychology Sub-Committee. 
The procedure for recruiting participants to the study is described in Section 2.2. 
After informed consent was obtained, the children were individually interviewed on 
their own or with a parent present, whichever the child preferred. The interviews 
with the children were audio taped and their answers scored later. The parents 
completed the Asperger' s Checklist while the experimenter was assessing the child. 
The Socialisation Domain of the Vineland was completed in a separate, structured 
interview with the parent, lasting up to 45 minutes. 
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The first order theory of mind tasks were presented verbally to the children along 
with the appropriate actions. The other tasks (unless otherwise stated below) were 
read aloud to each child and the story and test questions in written form were placed 
in front of the child so that the child could read along with the experimenter, either 
silently or aloud. The stories were introduced to the children as follows: "Here are 
some stories and some questions. I'm going to read out the stories and I'd like you 
to listen carefully and help me with the questions about each story." These 
instructions could be repeated if necessary before each different task. Positive 
comments were made throughout the testing session to encourage the participants, 
but no feedback was given about the correctness of the responses. There was only 
one trial for each task. The tasks were presented in the same order for all participants, 
starting with the simpler theory of mind tasks in order to prevent a possible loss of 
motivation due to initial failure. In order of presentation, the procedure of 
administrating the experimental tasks was as follows: 
1. Smarties task. This 1st order theory of mind task was presented using the exact 
wording and procedure as described in Sparrevohn and Howie (1995, p.255): 
The experimenter produces a Smarties box from her bag and asks the child, ''What 
do you think is in here?". "Smarties!", the child answers. The experimenter opens 
the box and to the child's surprise, the contents are not Smarties but coloured 
pencils. The experimenter states, "No, look, there are pencils". She puts the pencils 
back into the box, closes the box, and asks the following two prompt questions: 
Reality Prompt: "What's in here?'' (correct answer: pencils) 
Memory Prompt: ''When I first asked you what did you say?" (correct answer: 
Smarties) 
Then the child is asked about a sibling or parent: "S/he hasn't seen this box. When 
s/he comes in, I'll show her/him this box just like this and ask what's in here?'' 
Prediction test: ''What will (name) say?" (correct answer: Smarties) 
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Reality check: "Is that what's really in the box?" (correct answer: no) "What's 
really in the box?" (correct answer: pencils) 
Memory check: "Do you remember, when I took the box out of my bag and asked 
you what was in it, what did you say?" (correct answer: Smarties). 
Participants had to answer all prompt and check questions correctly, as well as the 
prediction (false belief) question, to pass this task. 
2. Ice cream van story. This 2"d ·order theory of mind task used the exact wording 
and procedure as used by Baron-Cohen (1989b). The experimenter laid out a toy 
village in front of the child (see Figure 2.1). The written form of the story was not 
placed in front of the child. The experimenter then told the following story, moving 
the characters and ice cream van accordingly: 
This is John and this is Mary. They live in this village. 
Naming questions: Which is John?!Mary? 
Here they are in the park. Along comes the ice cream man. John would like to buy 
an ice cream but he has left his money at home. He is very sad. "Don't worry," says 
the ice cream man, "you can go home and get your money and buy some ice cream 
later. I'll be here in the park all afternoon." "Oh, good~' says John, "I'll be back in 
the afternoon to buy an ice cream." 
Prompt question 1: Where did the ice cream man say to .John he would be all 
afternoon? 
So John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the ice cream man says, "I am 
going to drive my van to the church and see if I can sell my ice creams outside 
there." 
Prompt question 2: Where did the ice cream man say he was going? 
Prompt question 3: Did John hear that? 
The ice cream man drives over to the church. On his way, he passes John's house. 
John sees him and says "Where are you going?" The ice cream man says, "I'm 
going to sell some ice cream outside the church." So off he drives to the church. 
Prompt question 4: Where did the ice cream man tell John he was going? 
Prompt question 5: Does Mary know that the ice cream man has talked to John? 
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Now Mary goes home. She lives in this house. Then she goes to John's house. She 
knocks on the door and says "Is John in?" "No," says his mother, "he's gone out to 
buy an ice cream." 
Belief question: Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice cream? 
Justification question: Why? 
Reality question: Where did John really go to buy his ice cream? 
Memory question: Where was the ice cream man in the beginning? 
Participants had to answer all prompt questions and the false belief question correctly 
to pass this task. 
Figure 2.1. Scenario at start of Ice cream Story. 
3. Strange Stories. The children were presented with one example of each story type 
(12 stories in total). All the children were presented with the same set of stories and 
in the same order (as listed above in Materials section). Some examples of Strange 
Stories can be found in Appendix 6. 
4. Sally-Andy task. This 1st order theory of mind task was presented using the 
procedure as described in Baron-Cohen (1989a). See Figure 2.2. In addition to the 
false belief question, "Where will Sally look for her marble?", the children were 
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asked memory and reality control questions ("Where was the marble in the 
beginning?" and "Where is the marble really?"). The participants passed this task 
only if these contro l and bel ief questions were answered correctly and the child 
demonstrated slhe could name the puppets correctly. 
Figure 2.2. Scenario of Sally-Andy test. 
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5. Birthday Puppy Story. This 2nd order story was presented without any displays or 
props, although the written form of the story was placed in front of each chi ld and 
they were encouraged to read along with the experimenter, either silently or aloud. 
The wording was changed slight ly from the version in Tager-Fiusberg and Sullivan 
( 1994b) to facilitate the present study's British participants' understanding of the 
story. The word 'basement' was replaced with the word 'garage' and the word 
'Mom' rep laced with ' Mum' . The participants only scored a pass on the 2nd order 
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false belief question if all control and ignorance questions were answered correctly. 
The full story as used in this study is reproduced in Appendix 5. 
6. Social Reasoning subtest of the BAS. This subtest was introduced, administered 
and scored as per the instructions in the manual (Elliot, Murray & Pearson, 1978). 
7. British Picture Vocabulary Scale. The Short Form of this test was introduced, 
administered and scored as per the instructions in the manual (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton 
& Pintilie, 1982). 
2.5 Scoring of Theory of Mind 
Participants were separated into groups on the basis of performance on theory of 
mind (ToM) tasks. There were three ToM groups: no ToM, 1st order ToM and 2"d 
order ToM. Only children who passed both 1st order theory of mind tasks (and failed 
both 2"d order tasks) were placed in the 1st order ToM group. Only children who 
passed both 2"d order tasks were placed in the 2"d order ToM group. 
The participants were also given a theory of mind score. This score was a more 
inclusive measure of theory of mind ability as credit was given for all tasks passed. 
For example, the children who passed only one 1st order task were placed in the no 
ToM group using the above method, and their success on one task was effectively 
ignored. The ToM Score included this important information about theory of mind 
ability. The ToM Score ranged from 0 to 4. 
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2.6 Scoring of Strange Stories Justifications. 
The justifications of responses to Strange Stories were categorised firstly as correct 
or incorrect, and secondly as either involving mental state terms or physical/logical 
terms. A justification could be incorrect because it was factually wrong or because it 
was inappropriate in the context of the story. Justifications were scored as mental 
state when they referred (implicitly or explicitly) to thoughts, feelings, desires, traits 
and dispositions. Physical/logical justifications included those that referred to non-
mental events - how things looked, physical events, actions of objects, etc. If the 
participant gave more that one response, they were given credit for their best answer 
- a mental state answer 'trumped' a physical/logical answer. Examples of answers in 
each category of response are given in Appendix I 0. 
2. 7 Scoring of Social Reasoning Responses 
As well as the developmental stage of social reasoning being assessed by this test, 
the participants' responses on this subtest were examined for use of four categories 
of phrases or terms: Physical Consequences, Emotions, Value Judgements and 
Elaboration of Story. The Emotions and Elaboration of Story were mental state 
categories and the Physical Consequences and Value Judgements were non-mental 
state categories. 
2.8 Data Analysis 
Data were analysed using SPSS Version 8.0 for Windows. Non-parametric tests 
were used throughout the analysis due to the small number of participants in this 
study. As non-parametric tests (or distribution-free tests) make relatively few 
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assumptions about the nature of the data population, they are ideal for small data sets 
where assumptions of normality may not be met. Since there were very few 
instances of missing data, they were not pro-rated but remained missing. Between 
groups statistical procedures were mainly either Jonckheere-Terpstra (3 independent 
groups) or Mann-Whitney (2 independent groups). For analysis of two related 
groups, the Wilcoxon statistical procedure was used. The Spearman correlation test 
was used when associations between variables were examined. Where chi-square 
tests were utilised, the Fisher's exact test was used if any cell had an expected count 
of less than five. 
Significance levels were set at 0.05. Although non-parametric tests were used, SPSS 
automatically fits the data to a normal approximation when calculating significance. 
Therefore, the Exact Significance was used. This significance level is based on the 
exact distribution of the data rather than a normal approximation, and is particularly 
useful when the data set is relatively small and could possibly contain many ties. 
These were used except where multiple statistics were being performed on a single 
group of variables (e.g. theory of mind levels). In those cases, Bonferroni 
corrections were used to adjust significance levels. In practice, this meant a 
significance level of 0.016 was used for Mann Whitney comparisons on the three 




Of the 28 children and parents contacted, nineteen replied to the initial contact letter. 
Two of those subsequently dropped out. Therefore, seventeen children ( 16 male, 1 
female) with high-functioning autism or Asperger's Syndrome participated in this 
study. The majority (82%) ofthe children in this study had a diagnosis of Asperger's 
syndrome and only 18% had a diagnosis of high-functioning autism. There was no 
significant difference between these diagnostic groups on total scores of the 
Asperger's Checklist (z =-0.435, ns). There was also no significant difference on the 
scores for the sixteen items of the Checklist considered most characteristic of 
Asperger's syndrome (z=-0.654, ns). Both these results indicated that behavioural 
and diagnostic features were homogenous across participants. 
3.2 Chronological Age 
The children were aged between 7 years 2 months and 17 years 2 months (mean 11 
years 11 months, s.d.=2.55). When participants were separated on the basis of theory 
of mind (ToM) performance, there were no differences of mean chronological age 
between the groups (J-T =1.597, ns). Similarly, there were no significant differences 
of mean chronological age when participants were separated on the basis of social 
reasoning performance (J-T=0.545, ns), or use of mental state terms in Strange 
Stories Justifications (z=-0.963, ns). 
3.3 Verbal Mental Age 
The mean verbal mental age of all the children participants was 9 years 1 month 
(s.d.= 2.44, range from 4 years 5 months to 13 years 10 months). The verbal mental 
age of two children was below the preferred limit of 5 years. However, as normal 
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children are able to successfully pass at least 1st order theory of mind tasks at age 4, a 
verbal mental age of 4 years 5 months should be sufficient to exclude the possibility 
that failure is due to poor language ability. 
3.4 1st Order Theory of Mind Ability 
All children passed all control questions. 18% of the participants failed one of the 1st 
order ToM tasks and a further 12% failed both 1st order ToM tasks. Participants 
were required to pass both theory of mind tasks to be credited with 1st order ToM 
ability. Therefore, 76% of the participants successfully demonstrated 1st order theory 
of mind ability (one child who failed the "Smarties" task passed both 2nd order tasks 
and so was placed in the 2nd order group). Of all the participants, 88% passed the 
Sally-Anne task and 70% the "Smarties" task. There were no significant differences 
between the numbers of passers and failers between the tasks (Fisher's Exact Test, 
X2 • =5.44, ns). See Figure 3.1 below for comparison with success on 2nd order tasks. 
Figure 3.1. Percentage of total p articip ants passing each 








Theory of M iod Task 
3.5 2nd Order Theory of Mind Ability 
Ice Cream 
2nd Order 
6% of the participants failed one 2nd order ToM task and a further 53% failed both 
2nd order tasks. Participants were required to pass both 2nd order ToM tasks to be 
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credited with 2"d order theory of mind ability. Therefore, 41% of the participants 
successfully demonstrated 2"d order theory of mind ability (the one child who failed 
the Ice Cream Van task and passed the Birthday Puppy task was placed in I st order 
ToM group as he had passed both 1st order tasks). See Figure 3. I above for 
comparison with success on I st order tasks. 
Justifications to Ice Cream Van Story 
Two of the seven children who p~ssed this task explicitly used 2"d order mental state 
justifications for their answers ("because she doesn't know that John knows the ice 
cream man is at the church"). Three of the justifications referred to the point in the 
story where the false belief is set up ("because that's where he told John he would be 
all afternoon"). In these responses it is implicit that these are Mary's beliefs about 
John's knowledge. One participant's justification was incorrect in the context 
("because she wasn't told that he was going to be at the church") and one did not 
give a justification. 
Incorrect responses to the false belief question of the Ice Cream Van Story were 
justified in three instances with reference to Mary's knowledge only ("because Mary 
knows it's there"~ "because the ice cream man told her he was going to the church"). 
Three other justifications focussed on the physical presence of the van at the church 
("because that's where it is"). Four who failed the task did not give any justification. 
Justifications to Birthday Pugpy Story 
One of the eight children who passed this task used a justification that was explicitly 
2"d order ("because she doesn't know that he knows") and one used an implicit 2"d 
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order justification ("Mum thinks that Peter hasn't seen the puppy"). Two responses 
focussed on information communicated in the story ("because she told Peter she had 
got him a toy") and three focussed on the deception being employed in the story 
("Mum wants to keep it a secret"). One justification was incorrect in the context. 
Three who failed this task did not give a Justification. Four children answered the 1st 
order ignorance question incorrectly and therefore answered the false belief question 
correctly but for the wrong reasons. Their Justifications centred on the deception. 
Two Justifications of the children who failed this task were incorrect in the context. 
3.6 Summary of Theory of Mind Ability 
In total, 24% (4) of the participants failed to demonstrate either 1st or 2nd order ToM 
ability; 35% (6) were limited to 1st order ToM ability; and 41% (7) demonstrated 2nd 
order ToM ability. 
Participants were also given a total theory of mind score from 0 to 4, comprising of 
the total number of theory of mind tasks passed. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the 
majority (64.7%) of children who passed one task at a particular theory of mind level 
passed them both, achieving scores of 2 or 4. However, some participants scored 1 
or 3, indicating that they passed one task only at a particular theory of mind level. 
See Table 3.1 for the spread of scores across all participants. 
Table 3. 1. Percentage and number of all participants' theory of mind scores. 
I 
I Theory of Mind Score 
I .00 I 1.00 I 2.00 I 3.00 I 4.00 
I Percent I 11.8% I 11.8% I 29.4% I 11.8% I 35.3o/o 
I Count I 2 I 2 I 5 I 2 I 6 
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3. 7 Verbal Mental Age and Theory of Mind Ability 
There was a significant trend for differences in verbal ability across the three theory 
of mind groups (no theory of mind, 1st order, 2"d order) (J-T=2.00, p<0.05). Success 
on theory of mind tasks was 
Fi&ure 3.2. Boxplot of verbal mental ages at each 













no ToM 1st Order ToM 2nd Order ToM 
positively correlated with 
verbal mental age, and the 
correlation was significant 
(r=0.549, p<0.05). There was 
notable overlap of verbal 
ability across the three groups 
(see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.2 
below). The mean verbal 
mental age was not 
significantly different between any two groups (using Bonferroni corrections for 
multiple comparisons): no theory of mind and 1st order (z=-1.39, ns); no ToM and 2"d 
order (z=-1.80, ns); 1st order and 2"d order (z=-0.94, ns). 
Table 3.2. Mean and range of chronological and verbal mental ages for different levels of 
theory of mind attainment. 
I I Age I Verbal Mental Age (Y ears:Months) (Y ears:Months) Cl No ToM I Mean I 11:3 I 6:10 I Range I 8:9-15:8 I 4:5-9:6 
ry I 1st Order !Mean I 10:10 I 9:1 
Mind Level I ToM I Range I 7:2-13:4 I 6:8-11:6 
2nd Order !Mean I 13:3 I 10:4 
ToM I Range I 11:4-17:2 I 8:3-13:10 
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3.8 "Strange Stories" 
The majority (88%) of the participants had a total Comprehension score of 9 or more 
(the maximum score being 12). One child failed to give any answers to the Strange 
Stories and was excluded from further analysis of this test. 
All of the remaining participants used mental state Justifications for at least some of 
their responses. The number of mental states used in Justifications (correct and 
incorrect) range :from two to eleven (out of twelve). The number of physical state 
answers ranged from one to ten (out of twelve). 
The participants were separated into groups on the basis of use of mental states in 
Justifications. Low use was defined as scores one standard deviation or more below 
the mean. Moderate scores were within one standard deviation of the mean, and 
High scores were one standard deviation or more above the mean. This meant that 
31% (5) were in the Low use group and 69% (11) in the Moderate use group. There 
were no participants in the High use group as there was a ceiling effect: the 
maximum score possible was 12 and the highest score achieved was 11 and this was 
within the "moderate" range. There were no significant differences in mean verbal 
mental age between the Low and Moderate use groups (z=-0.741, ns). 
Table 3.3. Mean number of (i) overall and (ii) correct mental and physical state responses to 
Justifications on Strange Stories for groups separated by proportion of mental states used. 
I 
I Low and High Use of Mental Justifications Groups 
I Low I High 
I Mean I Mean 
I Overall Mental Justifications I 4.20 I 9.00 
I Overall Physical Justifications I 6.20 I 2.82 
I Correct Mental Justifications I 2.20 I 6.82 
I Correct Physical Justifications I 2.20 I 2.18 
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Table 3.3 above shows the mean number of overall mental and physical state 
Justifications and mean number of correct mental and physical Justifications for Low 
and Moderate use groups. 
3.9 Theory of Mind and "Strange Stories" 
Theory of mind scores were significantly and positively correlated with total 
Justification scores for the Strange Stories (r=O. 77, p<0.05). ToM score was not 
associated with overall use of mental state justifications (r=0.41, ns), but was 
positively and significantly correlated with correct mental justifications (r=0.56, 
p<0.05). This correlation between correct mental state justifications and theory of 
mind ability remained significant even when correcting for verbal ability (r=0.51, 
p<0.05). The mean number of mental state terms per se did not differ significantly 
between the three ToM groups (J-T=l.66, ns). However, correct mental state 
N' 
Figure 3.3. Mean number of mental and 
physical terms used in Justifications at each 
level oftheory of mind ability (max.=l2). 
10~------------------~ 
8 +--------
No ToM 1st Order 2nd Order 
Theory of Mind Level 
Ill mental 
Dphysical 
explanations for characters' 
utterances in the Stories was 
significantly different across 
the three groups (J-T= 2.43, 
p<0.05). Figure 3.3 shows 
how the use of mental state 
terms increased with 
increasing theory of mind 
ability. Even those who failed to demonstrate any theory of mind ability still used 
mental state terms in their answers. The children with 2nd order theory of mind 
ability used significantly more mental state terms in the correct context than children 
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with 1st order (z=-2.11, p<0.05) or no ToM ability (z=-2.33, p<0.05). Figure 3.4 
shows how the correct use 
of mental and physical state 
terms in Justification 
answers varied across the 
three theory of mind 
groups. 
3.10 Social Reasoning 
Figure 3.4. Mean number of correct mental 
and physical Justifications at each level of 
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There were five levels of social reasontng ability that could potentially be 
demonstrated by the children in this study. At least 50% of normal children between 
the ages of seven and seventeen would be expected to achieve at least level 2 
("partial evaluation"). However, none of the participants in this study achieved 
levels of social reasoning ability higher than level 2. 19% of the participants were 
judged to be at a pre-reasoning level (level 0) of social reasoning, and the largest 
proportion of participants (50%) were limited to level I social reasoning ("immediate 
consequences"). All of these were below the 5th percentile for their chronological 
age. The rest (31%) achieved level 2 ("partial evaluation"), which were average 
levels of social reasoning ability for their chronological ages. 
When compared to verbal mental age rather than chronological age, twice the 
number (62%) of autistic children had achieved average levels of social reasoning 
ability, indicating that the majority of participants' social reasoning ability was in 
keeping with the rest of their cognitive abilities. 
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3.11 Verbal Mental Age and Social Reasoning 
There was a significant trend for differences in verbal ability across the three social 
reasoning groups (pre-reasoning; immediate consequences; partial evaluation) (J-T= 
2.289, p<0.05). Performance 
Figure 3.5. Boxplot of verbal mental age at each 
social reasoning level. on social reasoning tasks was 
14.00-----------------, 
positively correlated with 
verbal mental age, and the 
CD 10.00 correlation was significant 
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overlap of verbal ability 
across the three groups (see 
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.4). 
The mean verbal mental age 
was not significantly different between any two groups (using Bonferroni corrections 
for multiple comparisons): "pre-reasoning" and "immediate consequences" (z=-1.85, 
ns); "pre-reasoning" and "partial evaluation" (z=-1.81, ns); "immediate 
consequences" and "partial evaluation" (z=-1.18, ns). 
Table 3.4. Mean and range of chronological and verbal mental ages for different levels of 
social reasoning attainment. 
r- I Age I Verbal Mental Age (Years:Months) (Years:Months) 
~I Pre-reasoning 
I Mean I 11:6 I 5:11 
I Range I 8:9-15:8 I 4:5-8:11 
Immediate I Mean I 12:7 I 9:1 · Reasoning I Consequences I Range I 10:2-17:2 I Level 6:8-11:6 
I I Partial Evaluation Mean 12:1 I 10:8 
I Range I 9:2-14:10 I 8:3-13:10 
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3.12 Theory of Mind and Social Reasoning 
There were s ignificant differences in mean ToM score between the groups of 
chi ldren defined by level of social reasoning ability (J-T=2.93. p<0.05). The 
children with level 0 (pre-reasoning) social reasoning were s ignificantly poorer at 
theory of mind tasks than those with "immediate consequences" or "partial 
evaluation" reasoning ability (z =-2.438, p<0.05). Higher levels of social reasoning 
ability were associated with greater success on ToM tasks (r =0.715, p<0.05). This 
association between social reasoning and theory of mind ability remained significant 
even when correcting for verbal ability (r=0.574, p<0.05). 
Fi~W1! 3.6. Pie chart of distnbution of social reasoning levels at each level of 
theory of mind ability. 
Sedll Rea •c LeTei 
0 Pre-rnsoning 
0 Immediate Consequences 
0 Parllal Evaluation 
The majority (75%) of chi ldren in the No ToM group were at the pre-reasoning 
developmental stage of social reasoning. As can be seen in Figure 3.6 above, autistic 
children with l st order or 2nd order ToM ability all achieved at least the "immediate 
consequences" level of social reasoning, and the proportion with level 2 (partial 
evaluation) increased with higher order theory of mind attainment. 
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3.13 Theory of Mind and Social Skills 
From a total possible score of 32 on the mentalist items, children who passed 1st or 
2"d order tasks achieved scores ranging from 2 to 18; none of the children who 
passed 2"d order tasks achieved a score lower than 11. The children in the no ToM 
group scored between 0 and 13. There were significant differences between the three 
ToM groups' mean total scores on the set of sixteen mentalist social skills (J-
T=2.165, p<0.05). Using Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons, there 
were no significant differences in total mentalist scores between the no ToM and 1st 
order groups (z=-0.130, ns), or between the no ToM and 2"d order groups (z=-1.50, 
ns). The 2"d order group had significantly higher mean total mentalist scores than the 
1st order group (z=-2.158, p<O.Ol6). 
There was a positive correlation between ToM Score and total score for the mentalist 
set of social skills (r=0.489, p<0.05). This association did not remain significant 
when correcting for verbal mental age (r=0.377, ns) or for chronological age 
(r=0.325, ns). Correlations between individual mentalist social skills and theory of 
mind performance are tabled in Appendix 11. Only two out of the sixteen mentalist 
social skills were significantly correlated with theory of mind performance: controls 
anger at constructive criticism (r=0.443, p<0.05); apologises for unintentional slights 
(r=0.51 0, p<0.05). 
Nine out of sixteen of the social skills judged to require theory of mind ability were 
shown by children in the no theory of mind group. Four of the mentalist (I st order) 
social skills were shown only by children with 1st or 2"d order theory of mind ability 
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(controls anger at constructive criticism~ apologises for unintentional slights; 
apologises for mistakes~ imitates a complex task several hours after). For one of the 
non-mentalist social skills clusters (Belonging to Groups), a score above zero was 
only seen in children with 1st order ability or above. None of the 2"d order mentalist 
social skills were seen exclusively in children with 2"d order theory of mind ability. 
The majority of non-mentalist social skills clusters were seen in children across all 
three theory of mind groups. 
3.14 "Strange Stories" and Social Skills 
Autistic children who used Moderate levels of mental state Justifications achieved 
higher mean total scores on the set of mentalist social skills than children in the Low 
use group (z=-2.557, p<0.05). The total score of mentalist social skills performed in 
everyday life was associated with the use of mental state Justifications (r=0.511, 
p<0.05) and this association remained positive and significant when correcting for 
verbal mental age (r=0.482, p<0.05). There was also an association between correct 
mental state Justifications and total score of mentalist social skills (r=O. 782, p<0.05), 
which remained positive and significant when correcting for verbal mental age 
(r=0.637, p<0.05). 
The use of mental states in Justification responses was significantly correlated with 
use of only three out of the sixteen individual mentalist social skills (see Appendix 
11 ). The same three mentalist social skills and two further mentalist social skills 
were significantly associated with the correct use of mental states in Justifications. 
Only children who used a moderate proportion of mental state terms in Justifications 
showed those same five mentalist social skills. All other social skills (both mentalist 
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and non-mentalist) were shown by children with moderate and low use of mental 
state terms in Justifications. 
3.15 Theory of Mind & Themes Identified in Social Reasoning Task 
Physical Consequences 
The identification of Physical Consequences for the main protagonist's actions was 
very similar across the three theory of mind groups (no ToM; 1st order ToM; 2nd 
order ToM). Children from all three groups consistently pointed out, appropriately, 
that the main characters would "get into trouble" for their actions. However, that 
physical hurt may be inflicted as a result of a character's actions was only recognised 
by children with 1st or 2nd order theory of mind ability. Only one child from the no 
ToM group exclusively used physical consequences in social reasoning responses; all 
other children used more than one category of response. 
Emotions 
Various appropriate emotions were attributed to story characters - sadness, anxiety, 
annoyance and fear - but only by those children who achieved 1st or 2nd order theory 
of mind ability. No child in the 1st and 2nd order groups failed to attribute emotions 
in their responses to the social reasoning task. Although children in the no ToM 
group occasionally mentioned emotions, it was much less frequently than the other 
two groups, and they were mainly wrong in the given context (e.g. using "jealous" to 
describe how one boy would feel after having his favourite toy stolen). However, the 




In this study, value judgements were statements that expressed an opinion about the 
correctness of a particular action or statements about rules of behaviour. Children in 
all three groups consistently identified "wrong" behaviour ("it was wrong to steal"; 
"shouldn't have done that"), and also remarked upon rules that should not be broken 
("should do as you're told"; "should be in on time"). Only children with 1st or 2"d 
order theory of mind ability identified the breaking of a promise as "wrong" 
behaviour. Half of the children in these 1st and 2"d order groups identified this 
behaviour. Only children with 2"d order ability offered suggestions about when it 
may be acceptable to break a promise (e.g. "Mum may have had to work and so she 
couldn't take Alan to the zoo as promised"). Only three of the 2"d order group made 
these suggestions. 
Elaboration of Story 
Only three children, who demonstrated 2"d order theory of mind ability, produced 
explanations for characters' behaviour that elaborated on the contents of the original 
story. Examples of elaborations include: "Maybe the child had gone to see a film 
and it finished later than she thought and that was why she was late"; or, "Mum was 
annoyed because she was worried her daughter may have been kidnapped or killed". 
Additionally, only children with 2"d order theory of mind ability (four out of the 
seven) identified the importance of how both characters' feelings played a part in the 
action. 
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3.16 Social Reasoning and Social Skills 
There were no significant differences in the mean total score of mentalist social skills 
shown by children in the different social reasoning groups (J-T=l.627, ns). There 
was a significant correlation between social reasoning level and total score of 
mentalist social skills shown in everyday life (r=0.448, p<O.OS) which did not remain 
significant when correcting for verbal mental age (r=0.341, ns). 
Nine out of the sixteen mentalist social skills were not performed by any child with 
only pre-reasoning social reasoning ability. In addition, the children in the pre-
reasoning group did not perform any social skills in twelve out of the 23 non-
mentalist clusters. 
The types of responses given to social reasoning tasks were compared to the pattern 
of everyday social skills. Children who mainly reasoned about the social situations 
on the basis of rules (e.g. "shouldn't take without asking") showed few mentalist 
social skills in everyday life. These children were in the no ToM or 151 order ToM 
groups. One child in 1st order group used the same strategy to answer most of the 
social reasoning situations. This child identified the main protagonist as being "sad" 
and reasoned that the characters who had made the protagonist sad would "get into 
trouble". This strategy, although appropriate in the contexts, was used for four out of 
six questions. This child performed very few mentalist social skills in everyday life. 
Children who frequently referred to story characters' emotions performed many of 
the mentalist social skills in everyday life. Children who referred to rules in relation 
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to story characters' emotions (e.g. "getting home late was bad because Mum would 
be worried"), rather than as concrete or inflexible constructs (e.g. "shouldn't be 
late"), showed the most mentalist social skills. 
Children who used a variety of social reasoning strategies showed a greater amount 
of mentalist social skills in everyday life. These children were mostly in the 2"d 
order group. Children with 1st order ability tended to use just one or two types of 
responses (mainly emotions and value judgements/rules). However, the children 
with 1st order ability who did use a variety of responses also showed a great amount 
mentalist social skills in everyday life. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
4.1 Summary and Discussion of Results 
Throughout this section experimental hypotheses will be referred to where appropriate by 
their number (AI, B3, etc). 
Theory of Mind 
The participants were preselected to have a high chance of passing classic theory of 
mind tasks. Minimum chronological and verbal mental ages were set as criteria for 
inclusion in the study to ensure relatively high numbers of children who would 
demonstrate theory of mind ability. As a result, 76% of the participants passed both 
1st order tasks and 41% passed both 2nd order tasks. These proportions of autistic 
children who can pass theory of mind tasks are significantly different from the 
proportions in the original studies of theory of mind ability in autistic children (20% 
pass 1st order in Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; 0% pass 2nd order in Baron-Cohen, 1989b). 
The participants in this study had similar mean chronological ages, but higher verbal 
mental ages, than the participants in Baron-Cohen et al's (1985) study, which could 
explain some of the differences in 1st order ability. However, the participants in this 
study had lower mean chronological ages and very similar mean verbal mental ages 
to Baron-Cohen's (1989b) study, and yet still performed more successfully on 2nd 
order theory of mind tasks. It therefore seems unlikely that age or verbal ability 
factors could account for the higher 2nd order ability seen in the current study. 
53o/o of autistic children who passed 1st order tasks in this study also passed the 2nd 
order tasks. This proportion is very similar to the proportion of participants in Tager-
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Flusberg & Sullivan's (1994b) study, where 58% of participants, who had been 
selected for the study because they had previously passed a 1st order task, passed the 
2nd order task. The mean chronological and verbal mental ages of the participants in 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan' s ( 1994b) study were also very close to those of the 
current study. 
Justifications to 2nd Order Theory of Mind Tasks 
The pattern of justification responses to the Ice Cream Van Story in this study were 
different to those discussed by Bowler ( 1992), in that fewer responses in the current 
study centred on the point in the story at which the false belief is set up. Only three 
out of the seventeen participants gave this type of justification, in comparison with 
the majority of Bowler's ( 1992) participants. Also, two of the participants gave 
(correct) 2nd order mental state justifications and three gave (incorrect) 1st order 
mental state justifications, whereas only one autistic participant of Bowler's ( 1992) 
study gave a mental state response (1st order). 
As none of Baron-Cohen's (1989b) autistic participants passed the 2nd order false 
belief task, no comparison of justifications can be made with those who were 
successful in the current study. Ofthose who failed in Baron-Cohen's (1989b) study, 
half of the children used inappropriate 1st order justifications and the rest focus sed 
on the physical aspects of the story ("the van is at the church"). Both of these types 
of response were also seen in the children who failed the task in the present study. 
Although the current participants were more successful at passing the false belief 
tasks than Baron-Cohen's (1989b) participants, they used fewer mental state 
86 
justifications than the normal and Down's syndrome controls who passed the task in 
Baron-Cohen's (I 989b) study. 
The pattern of justification responses to the Birthday Puppy Story in this study was 
similar in some aspects to those found by Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (1994b). 
Similar proportions of participants used 2nd order justifications or focussed on 
information communicated in the story. 41% in the current study and 43% in Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan' s ( 1994b) study centred their justifications on the deception 
being employed in the story. However, in the current study more than half who did 
so actually failed the task (because they answered a control question incorrectly), in 
contrast with Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (1994b ). More children in the current study 
failed to give any justification for their response. 
Although the two 2nd order tasks are not directly comparable, some participants 
appeared to use similar strategies to answer both tasks. The children who gave 2nd 
order mental state explanations to the Ice Cream Van Story also gave mental state 
justifications to the Birthday Puppy story. Most children who failed to give a 
justification to either false belief question failed to give one to both. The strategy of 
focussing on the information given to characters in the story was more likely to be 
successful in the Birthday Puppy Story than the Ice Cream Van Story, but children 
tended to stick with the same strategy. As participants were given no feedback 
about the success or failure of their strategies, it is likely that they would stick to the 
strategies they believed to be appropriate. 
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The inconsistency between studies in the numbers of autistic participants able to pass 
false belief tasks is also relevant to the question of how central a theory of mind 
deficit is to autistic spectrum disorders (Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995). If other 
general factors such as language ability are having a significant impact on theory of 
mind performance, then the influence of language abilities and deficits in autism and 
the relative impact of theory of mind and language need to be examined in greater 
detail. 
Theory of Mind and Strange Stories 
The analysis of the data did not provide evidence to support the hypothesised 
relationships between theory of mind performance and the use of mental state terms 
in Justifications in the Strange Stories (AI). Children who did not pass theory of 
mind tasks used mental state terms in their Justifications (A2), suggesting that mental 
state terms can be used without an ability to reason about mental states. 
The results from the current study were very similar to the pattern of results in Happe 
(1994). The mean and range of different categories of responses (correct mental; 
correct physical; incorrect mental; incorrect physical) were almost identical to those 
found in Happe (1994), where larger numbers of correct mental state terms were 
used by autistic children with higher order theory of mind levels, but all groups used 
similar levels of mental state terms in general. 
One important difference between the current study and Happe (1994) was that the 
range of (i) total number of correct Justifications and (ii) number of correct mental 
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Justifications overlapped between the three theory of mind groups. The children in 
the no-ToM group performed no differently from the 1st order group in these areas, 
and both groups were less able than the 2"d order group in the current study. Happe 
( 1994) had suggested that the lack of overlap between the three theory of mind 
groups in her study supported the validity of classic theory of mind tasks: differences 
in performance on classic theory of mind tasks "reveal real underlying differences in 
the ability to attribute mental states correctly in a variety of tasks (pg. 138)". The 
current data do not support this claim. 
A positive correlation was found between the correct use of mental state terms and 
theory of mind. The use of mental state terms correctly in the context indicates some 
ability to reason about mental states. Children in all theory of mind groups used 
some mental state terms correctly (A3, A4). Several children in the 1st order ToM 
group used just one or two mental state terms to answer several of the questions (e.g. 
"he's lying" or "she's joking"). This is suggestive of a learned strategy being used 
regardless of the actual social problem, or may indicate an understanding of a limited 
set of mental states. 
Non-autistic children use mental state words such as want, know and think from a 
very early age, but initially use such terms in idiomatic ways (e.g. "I don't know"). 
The current data is suggestive of this developmental stage of language acquisition. 
Perhaps with greater age and experience such idiomatic strategies can be used in 
more complex ways by children with autism who do not, for some reason, move on 
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to the next developmental stage of using mental state terms to refer to psychological 
states. 
Both these possibilities- a genuine understanding of a limited set of mental states or 
idiomatic use of mental states with little understanding - would be consistent with 
the responses of one of the children in the no ToM group. 
Four out of seven correct uses of mental states for one child in the no ToM group 
involved the mental state of desire ("he wanted to ... "). Baron-Cohen ( 1991) found 
that the mental state of desire was one of the earliest to develop in children with 
autism, before the mental state of belief. It would be interesting to assess this child 
at a later date to examine if any further development in theory of mind had occurred 
(including belief), or whether reasoning about people's actions in terms of their 
desires was a strategy learned without a real understanding of mental states. The 
correct use of mental state terms could demonstrate an understanding of these terms, 
or could be related to good verbal ability and a sophisticated general reasoning 
strategy for dealing with social problems. 
Children with 2nd order theory of mind ability were more likely to use mental state 
terms correctly (A4). A wider set of mental states was used by this group and could 
be applied when appropriate. This suggests that some reasoning about mental states 
was occurring that perhaps facilitated the solving of false belief tasks. This would be 
consistent with the suggestion that flexible reasoning underlies success on theory of 
mind tasks (Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto & Frye, 1996). 
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Theory of Mind and Social Reasoning 
There was support for the experimental hypothesis of a positive correlation between 
theory of mind performance and social reasoning ability (B 1 ). Higher developmental 
levels of social reasoning were seen with increasing frequency in children with 
higher levels of theory of mind ability. There was no one-to-one mapping of social 
reasoning level to theory of mind level (B4, BS). The correlation between two 
different types of social reasoning task suggests that theory of mind ability is not 
separable from general social reasoning skills: In the current study, no child in the 
pre-reasoning group passed theory of mind tasks (B2) and no child who passed 
theory of mind tasks was at a pre-reasoning developmental stage of social reasoning 
(B3). This suggests that a general social reasoning deficit is related to theory of mind 
impairments in autistic children. 
There is other evidence consistent with this finding. Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto & 
Frye ( 1996) found positive correlation between theory of mind and non-social 
reasoning and suggested that "difficulties in theory of mind may depend on more 
general difficulties in flexible reasoning (pg. 483)". 
The early social impairments found in children with autism are also consistent with 
the idea that a more general reasoning difficulty may influence theory of mind. 
Social interaction deficits appear in autistic children before age two (Baron-Cohen, 
Alien & Gillberg, 1992), yet theory of mind only appears to develop at about age 
three or four in normal children (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This suggests that an 
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early general social reasoning impairment detrimentally affects later theory of mind 
development. 
Klin, Volkmar & Sparrow (1992) found some early-emerging (before eight months 
of age) social deficits in children with autism. The behaviours that were absent in 
the autistic participants are typically present in normally developing infants before 
the time at which theory of mind skills are thought to develop. Their data were 
consistent with the suggestion that social impairments in autism occur early in social 
development and are not limited to only those behaviours that require a theory of 
mind. Klin et al (1992) qualified their conclusions by suggesting that there may be 
two subgroups of children with autism: those for whom a general social impairment 
is primary, and those for whom a theory of mind deficit might be primary. 
These results conflict with Baron-Cohen' s ( 1988, 1994) suggestion that theory of 
mind is central to and underlies social and communication development. The theory 
of mind hypothesis implies that social deficits in autism result from a failure to 
develop mentalising skills and therefore, social development should proceed 
normally until that stage in development when (non-autistic) infants develop a theory 
of mind. 
Themes in Social Reasoning and Theory ofMind 
Analysis of the responses to social reasoning questions confirmed the association 
between the correct use of mental state terms and theory of mind ability found with 
the Strange Stories. Although children in the no ToM group spontaneously used 
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mental state terms in their answers in the social reasoning task (B6), they were likely 
to be incorrect in the context. Children with 1st or 2nd order theory of mind ability 
demonstrated some understanding of the mental state terms they used, in that the 
terms were correct in the given context, and sometimes children in the 2nd order 
group appropriately elaborated on the original story (B7). 
The differences between the theory of mind groups' use of mental state terms were 
not due to different verbal abilities. One child in the no ToM group used physical 
state terms accurately, but used mental state terms rarely and those were mainly 
wrong in the context. Another child, with 1st order ability, consistently used mental 
state terms in his reasoning about social situations. A third child, who had 2nd order 
ability, not only frequently used mental states when reasoning about social situations, 
but also elaborated on the original story, adding further information about people's 
motivations and emotions. All of these children had a verbal mental age of eight 
years and eleven months. 
Despite the variety of appropriate responses and some demonstration of an 
understanding of mental states, all of these children had severe social deficits in 
everyday life. The reasoning about social situations displayed in "laboratory" 
conditions was not reported in everyday social interactions. 
Theory of Mind and Social Skills 
Frith and colleagues (Frith et al, 1994; Fombonne et al, 1994; Hughes et al, 1997) 
and Dawson & Fernald (1987) found evidence consistent with Baron-Cohen et al's 
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(I985) claim that children with autism who pass theory of mind tasks will show a 
different pattern of social skills and deficits than those who fail such tasks. They 
found that some social behaviours which appeared to require mentalising ability were 
related to theory of mind performance in individuals with autistic spectrum disorders. 
In contrast, Sparrevohn & Howie (I995) and Prior et al (I990) found no correlation 
between theory of mind performance and everyday social behaviour. 
The current study found evidence of an association between total scores for mentalist 
social skills and theory of mind performance. However, when examined 
individually, very few individual social skills clusters or items from the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scales were positively correlated with theory of mind ability. 
Only two of the items judged as requiring theory of mind ability showed such an 
correlation. These two social skills (controls anger at constructive criticism; 
apologises for unintentional slights) were seen only in children with I st or 2nd order 
ability (C2), suggesting that theory of mind ability may be required to perform these 
skills in everyday life. Another two mentalist social skills were also only seen in 
children with I st order ability or higher (apologises for mistakes/errors in judgement; 
imitates a complex task several hours later). Although an apology can be made 
without feeling remorse, the social convention of apologising to avoid conflict needs 
to be learned from experience of social situations. Many of the children in this study 
could and did apologise when prompted by a parent, possibly indicating some 
understanding of the social conventions involved, but only children with theory of 
mind ability apologised appropriately and without prompting. This suggests that an 
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understanding of the situations that requtre an apology and the function of an 
apology in everyday life are associated with theory of mind ability. 
However, the majority of mentalist social skills were also performed in everyday life 
by children who did not demonstrate any theory of mind ability (C 1 ). There was 
therefore no support in this study for these social skills requiring theory of mind 
ability in order to be successfully performed. 
There was also no support for the hypothesis that the three 2nd order social skills 
would only be performed by children with 2nd order ability (C3). In fact, children in 
all three theory of mind groups showed these social skills in everyday life. There 
were no social skills that were exclusively shown by children with 2nd order ability in 
this study. 
Most of the items and clusters of behaviour in the Vineland Adaptive Behavior 
Scales involve interaction with other people. However, only very few of the items 
are about interactions with groups of people. It could be that 2nd order theory of 
mind ability is only necessary for group interactions, and that 1st order ability is 
sufficient for successful two-way interactions. 2nd order ability in everyday life may 
not be detected by the Vine land, and so no differences between the 1st and 2nd order 
groups would be detected. 
Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) commented that it may be necessary to assess both 
theory of mind and social behaviour in real-world settings to detect potentially subtle 
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associations between the two. Classic theory of mind tasks may not be sensitive 
enough instruments to measure everyday understanding of mental states and 
measures of social skills may need to be specifically developed or validated for 
children with autism to detect evidence of such understanding (Sparrevohn & Howie, 
1995). Items with more discriminable value with respect to theory of mind in autism 
may need to be developed. 
Autistic individuals vary extensively in the range and severity of social dysfunctions 
and some social skills do develop (sometimes as the result of intensive intervention). 
This makes the prediction from the theory of mind hypothesis that only certain social 
skills related to mentalising ability will be impaired in children with autism a 
complex issue. Real relationships between theory of mind and everyday social skills 
could be hidden by these factors and hence few associations found for individual 
social behaviours with theory of mind as in the current study. In addition, judging 
which social skills are unequivocally mentalist is difficult because there are many 
other routes to acquiring a social skill, such as rote learning or conditioned responses 
to proscribed situations. 
Strange Stories and Everyday Social Skills 
There was some support for the hypothesised experimental relationship between the 
use of mental state terms in Justifications and the performance of mentalist social 
skills in everyday life (D 1 ). Autistic children who used Moderate levels of mental 
state Justifications achieved higher mean total scores on the set of mentalist social 
skills than children in the Low use group. There was a slightly stronger correlation 
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between the use of correct mental state Justifications and total score of mentalist 
social skills. 
However, when examined individually, only a few individual social skills clusters or 
items from the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales were positively correlated with 
the correct use of mental state terms. Only children who used a moderate proportion 
of mental state terms in Justifications showed those mentalist social skills. All other 
social skills (both mentalist and non-ment~tlist) were shown by children with 
moderate and low use of mental state terms in Justifications (D2, D3). 
Neither of the mentalist social skills that were correlated to theory of mind ability 
were also correlated to the use of mental state terms. This suggests that the two 
measures of mentalising ability either were not assessing the same type of ability or 
that different types of strategies were being used by the participants to solve the 
tasks. Either option poses some problems for the accurate assessment of mentalising 
ability in children with autism. 
Social Reasoning and Everyday Social Skills 
Although there were no significant differences found in mean scores on the set of 
mentalist social skills between the social reasoning groups, it was noticeable how 
many of the individual items were not performed by any child in the pre-reasoning 
group. Children in the pre-reasoning group scored zero (i.e. never showed the social 
behaviour or group of behaviours) for about half of the individual mentalist items 
and half of the non-mentalist clusters. A deficit in social reasoning ability appeared 
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more devastating to social performance in everyday life than a deficit in theory of 
mind ability. Children in the no ToM group scored zero for less than one-fifth of all 
items and clusters. This supports the suggestion that theory of mind ability is one 
part of general social reasoning. If this is true, it is impossible to have a theory of 
mind ability without also having social reasoning ability, but it is possible to have 
social reasoning ability and not show theory of mind. Fewer social skills were 
impaired when compared to theory of mind performance because not demonstrating 
a theory of mind does not mean there is no sodal reasoning ability. 
There was some support for the experimental hypotheses about relationships between 
types of responses used on social reasoning tasks and everyday social skills. Children 
in this study who used mental state terms most often in social reasoning responses 
showed evidence of mentalist social skills in everyday life (E 1 ). Children who were 
flexible in their consideration of social rules were also more likely to show mentalist 
social skills. Children who reasoned in concrete, physical and rule-bound terms 
showed fewer mentalist social skills in everyday life (E4). Children who had access 
to more than one social reasoning strategy, who could use different strategies for 
different questions but could also use more that one strategy to answer one question, 
were the most socially able of the participants. 
Despite a range of theory of mind and social reasontng task performance, the 
children in the current study remained socially impaired in comparison to the non-
autistic population. Performance on tasks in this study did not directly relate to 
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everyday social performance. Even the children with apparently sophisticated 
reasoning abilities at hand did not seem to apply these skills in everyday life. 
'Laboratory' settings make the task of social reasoning easier - there is unlimited 
time to answer and no negative consequences of getting the answer wrong. It is 
possible that social reasoning could be learned by different, more cumbersome routes 
than in normal development, depending on intelligence and good verbal ability and 
motivation to learn. 
Leslie and Roth (1993) suggested general reasoning ability compensates for impaired 
theory of mind ability. General reasoning abilities could, through practice and 
experience, be used to create social reasoning strategies that compensate for the 
intuitive theory of mind abilities of non-autistic children. These compensatory social 
strategies would appear later in autism because of the need for practice and 
experience, and hence the greater verbal ability and chronological ages generally 
seen in autistic children who pass theory of mind tasks. The association found in the 
current study, that a minimum level of social reasoning was required before theory of 
mind tasks could be solved, is consistent with the idea that reasoning abilities less 
specific than theory of mind can be used to solve theory of mind tasks, at least in 
'laboratory' settings. 
Leslie & Roth (1993) report a study that found an association between success on 
theory of mind tasks and attainment of Piagetian concrete operations. This was only 
the case for children with autism, as non-autistic children display theory of mind 
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ability two or three years before attaining the concrete operational stage of 
development. The association between social reasoning and theory of mind 
performance in the present study also adds support to this possibility of autistic 
children using general reasoning resources to pass theory of mind tasks. 
4.2 Theoretical Implications 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith ( 1985) claimed that deficits in theory of mind were 
unique to people with autism and accounted for the pattern of characteristic 
impairments in social behaviour and other abilities. However, in their original study, 
14% of children with Down's syndrome also failed the theory of mind tasks. Other 
researchers have also found significant proportions of non-autistic individuals who 
fail such tasks. Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto & Frye (1996) found that 75% of adults 
with Down's syndrome failed false belief tasks, a performance significantly worse 
than the mental-age-matched non-learning-disabled controls. 
Zelazo et al' s ( 1996) findings of theory of mind task failure in a clinical group other 
than autism suggests that deficits in theory of mind can exist without an autistic 
pattern of social dysfunction. That the children in the current study largely showed 
similar patterns of social impairment regardless of theory of mind performance 
implies that deficits in social behaviour typical of autism can be seen in individuals 
who demonstrate theory of mind ability. 
The findings of the current study of links between general social reasontng and 
theory of mind, and that a lack of social reasoning ability was a better indicator of 
100 
everyday social dysfunction than a lack theory of theory of mind ability, are 
inconsistent with claims that theory of mind is domain-specific (Leslie & Thaiss, . 
1992). Proponents of the theory of mind hypothesis have demonstrated that the 
reasoning deficit in autism is limited to cognitive rather than perceptual reasoning 
(Reed & Peterson, 1990) and is limited to social rather than logical reasoning (Scott 
& Baron-Cohen, 1996). Other researchers have found that theory of mind deficits 
may develop from general reasoning impairments such as an inability to solve 
problems that require shifting from one perspective to the next about an single 
construct (e.g. such as is required for card sort tasks) (Zelazo et al, 1996) or failure to 
reason flexibly (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991 ). The current data analysis 
does not provide evidence to support the claim that theory of mind is an ability that is 
entirely separate from other types of reasoning. 
The current study has found evidence to suggest that the accurate measurement of 
theory of mind ability is confounded by numerous factors such as (i) verbal ability, 
(ii) several alternative strategies that can apparently be used to solve theory of mind 
tasks and ( iii) evidence that mental state terms can be used without understanding, all 
of which cast doubt on the ability of classic theory of mind tasks to detect the ability 
to attribute mental states. 
The data are consistent with a more complex picture of interactions between 
language, social reasoning, strategies that can approximate theory of mind ability and 
factors influencing the use of knowledge in the appropriate contexts. Certainly for 
the children who demonstrated 2"d order theory of mind ability in this study, there 
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appeared to be evidence supporting the weak central coherence theory of autism 
(Frith, 1989). 
The effects of weak central coherence could explain why some people with autistic 
spectrum disorders fail to show evidence of theory of mind ability in everyday life 
despite passing theory of mind tasks. This group of theory of mind "passers" may 
have knowledge of other people's minds and mental states, but fail to apply that 
knowledge effectively at the appropriate time· due to "local" level processing. For 
example, a literal understanding of language is a common feature of autistic-
spectrum disorders. Local level processing of a conversation may focus on 
individual words, causing an autistic individual to miss the speaker's intended 
meaning that attention to the whole context would make clear. The knowledge is 
available to them, but in the social context is not recognised as relevant (Bowler, 
1992; Frith & Happe, 1994). 
However, the current study did not find evidence to support the idea of one cognitive 
ability or deficit underlying theory of mind task performance and demonstration of 
the understanding of mental states in everyday life. 
4.3 Clinical Implications 
Social Subtypes 
Several attempts have been made to categorise various subtypes of autism to aid 
diagnosis and specify interventions. The three general patterns of social interaction 
of Wing & Gould' s ( 1979) study have been used to define three subtypes of autism 
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within the autistic spectrum: "aloof', "passive", or "active but odd". Baron-Cohen et 
al (1985) proposed that different subtypes of social behaviour in autism would be 
related to performance on theory of mind tasks. Volkmar & Klin (1993) suggested 
that, given the wide range of social deficits of individuals with autistic spectrum 
disorders, some attempt should be made to identify which aspects of social 
development in autism are related to general developmental delay, and which aspects 
"remain uniquely impaired in autism throughout development" (pg. 48). 
Several items of social behaviour were not performed by any of the autistic children 
across the age range in this study and were therefore likely to be related to a specific 
autistic deficit. Certain elements of conversational behaviour were rarely or never 
performed in this population: none initiated conversations of particular interest to 
others; none responded to hints or indirect cues in conversation. Only one child, who 
had been the subject of a rigorous behavioural programme to address this point, 
permitted conversations to continue without interruption. Items relating to 
friendships were also rarely seen: none of the children had a 'best friend' and only 
four attempted to make their own friends. Group activities, unless initiated by 
parents or school, were never seen in these autistic participants. 
These deficits, common to all participants, were seen in a wide age range and were 
independent of verbal ability, social reasoning ability or theory of mind ability. The 
population in this study was small, restricted to high-functioning individuals who had 
been referred to a psychology or psychiatry service, so generalised conclusions must 
be made with caution. However, one implication for psychological intervention may 
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be that, along with individualised intervention programmes, programmes aimed at 
facilitating friendships and teaching basic conversation skills may be appropriate for 
general group interventions for people with autistic spectrum disorders. 
Interventions for Autism 
The current findings have some implications for the interventions for autism aimed at 
teaching theory of mind skills. Social skills interventions for children and adults 
with autism have, in recent years, incorporated the teaching of mentalising skills (e.g. 
Ozonoff & Miller, 1995) or have focussed entirely on increasing theory of mind 
skills (e.g. Gray, 1994; Hadwin, Baron-Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 1996; Hadwin, 
Baron-Cohen, Howlin & Hill, 1997). Although these studies were mainly successful 
at teaching people with autism to pass the theory of mind tasks used in the 
interventions, none of the studies reported successful generalisation to other tasks 
(different in structure from the instruction tasks) and settings. 
The findings of the current study suggest that for perhaps only a very few children 
with high-functioning autism is a theory of mind deficit the only reason for social 
failure. It is more complicated, involving language skills and social reasoning 
abilities. Although it is tempting to think that a general intervention could address 
various individual social skills deficits, the current study found almost as many 
individual relationships between theory of mind performance and everyday social 
skills as there were participants in this study. Addressing theory of mind deficits 
alone to increase social adaptation may miss important aspects of an individual's 
presentation that are influencing everyday social performance. 
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4.4 Methodological Considerations. 
Participants 
As one of the aims of the study was to examine differences in social skills between 
children with 1st order and 2"d order theory of mind ability, the children were pre-
selected to have a high chance of passing theory of mind tasks. One of the criteria 
for initial selection was therefore to have a verbal ability of 5 years of age or more. 
Unfortunately, this reduced the available population size for a group that is rare in 
the general population and few children were· appropriate for inclusion in this study. 
However, the number of participants in this study was similar to sample sizes in 
similar studies. 
The chance of not finding a relationship that actually existed between variables was 
higher than is desirable due to the low numbers in the current study. Given the large 
number of statistical comparisons made and the small sample size in the current 
study, there is some likelihood that what significant results were found were the 
result of chance. That previous research has drawn some strong conclusions on the 
basis of similar sample sizes leaves open the possibility of similar errors. 
The participants in this study were not representative of the whole autistic spectrum. 
Only high-functioning, verbally able children participated, whereas up to 80% of 
autistic individuals function within the range of learning disabilities (Volkmar & 
Klin, 1993). It is therefore speculative to generalise the results found in the present 
study to children with autism with poor verbal ability and learning disabilities. 
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Theory of Mind Measures 
The theory of mind measures used in this study have been developed and used by · 
many researchers to examine theory of mind ability. However, these measures have 
not been validated, no test-retest reliability measurement has been done, and there is 
evidence that the success or failure on these tasks by autistic children can be 
influenced by the wording of the tasks (Bowler, 1992; Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991). 
The high association between success on these tasks and verbal ability only 
emphasises that the measures require a variety of skills and it is difficult to isolate 
one particular ability as being the sole reason behind success or failure. The right 
skill may be present in the autistic individual being studied, but they do not utilise 
that skill to solve the task for other reasons, such as lack of experience with those 
types of task. There is little proof that the theory of mind measures used in this study 
and commonly used in other studies of theory of mind ability are measuring actual 
mentalising ability. Therefore drawing conclusions as to why certain relationships 
between performance on these tasks and performance of skills in everyday life do or 
do not appear must be done with caution. 
Importantly, one-off testing of theory of mind ability offers no information about 
whether a deficit reflects a deviance or a delay in the development of the ability. 
The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 
The BPVS was used as the measure of verbal ability in the current study as it has 
been extensively used in previous studies of theory of mind ability and would 
facilitate comparison with such studies. However, although a reliable and valid 
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measure, it is only a measure of receptive verbal ability rather than general language 
functioning or overall developmental level. As theory of mind tasks are language-
based and associations have been found between theory of mind ability and verbal 
ability, a more comprehensive assessment of verbal ability, including verbal 
expressive ability, would be desirable. This would facilitate more accurate 
comparisons across different studies examining autistic populations or other clinical 
populations. 
Few studies have examined other aspects of the verbal ability of their participants, 
such as comprehension of complex syntax or expressive verbal ability. As theory of 
mind tasks are verbally presented and most require verbal answers, aspects other than 
recognition of vocabulary are likely to be relevant to task performance. It is an area 
that empirical studies of theory of mind in autism will need to explore further to 
understand fully the role of language in theory of mind ability. 
Measurement of Adaptive Behaviour 
Only one person's rating (a parent's) of the child's adaptive functioning was 
obtained in this study. This made it difficult to determine whether there was any 
distortion or inaccuracy in the reports obtained and gave little indication of a child's 
functioning in different environments. 
The Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales has been shown to be more reliable than 
other measures of adaptive behaviour (Voelker, Shore, Hakim-Larson & Bruner, 
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1997) and is specifically designed for use with parents (Sparrow, Balla & Cicchetti, 
1984). 
However, there are consistent findings that parents report lower levels of adaptive 
behaviour than teachers (e.g. Szatmari, Archer, Fisman & Streiner, 1994; Voelker et 
al, 1997) or clinicians (e.g. Sholle-Martin & Alessi, 1988). In the current study, 
parental perception of autistic children's social functioning could have been 
influenced by comparisons with non-autistic siblings and peers (Voelker et al, 1997) 
and the effects of coping with a behaviourally demanding child, and thus ratings of 
adaptive behaviour lower than the child's actual performance may have been 
obtained. Alternatively, the home environment may possibly reduce opportunities 
for children to display better adaptive skills or for parents to observe adaptive 
behaviour. Both of these possibilities could obscure instances of everyday mentalist 
social behaviour, and thus explain to some extent the lack of relationship found 
between many aspects of social behaviour and theory of mind performance. 
Derivation of Set of Mentalist Social Skills 
There is a wealth of research and observational evidence of the specific social 
behaviours that are impaired in autism. Previous studies looking at the relationship 
between theory of mind and social behaviour used such evidence to derive sets of 
behaviours that seemed likely to require a theory of mind ability (e.g. Frith et al, 
1994). In the current study, the items of social behaviour were judged using strict 
criteria with reference to the postulated influence of theory of mind and not 
diagnostic criteria for autism. This was an attempt to minimise the possibility that 
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any correlations found were due to the co-existence of characteristic features within 
the population being studied rather than an effect of the influence of theory of mind 
ability. 
The items in the mentalist set of social skills were not matched for developmental 
level or difficulty. It is therefore difficult to determine whether these behaviours are 
characteristic of a different stage in development from the other clusters of social 
skills (Frith, Happe & Siddons) and direct comparisons were confounded by this. 
4.5 Future Research 
A desire to keep assessment time to a mtntmum in the current study precluded 
extensive cognitive testing of participants. However, in future research it would be 
essential to measure non-verbal cognitive abilities as well as a wider range of verbal 
abilities in order to assess the relative contributions of these factors to theory of mind 
performance in individuals with autism. It would also be essential to include 
measures of logical and general social reasoning ability and compare such ability 
with theory of mind ability in the same group of autistic individuals. The difficulties 
in gathering data from a large enough population of high-functioning autistic 
individuals probably preclude analysis of the relative impact of these various factors 
unless a national collaborative effort is made. 
In order to examine the question of whether autistic social dysfunction is a result of a 
social reasoning or theory of mind deficit, or due to a failure in the application of 
such an ability, a reliable and valid measure of central coherence would need to be 
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used along with measures of theory of mind and social reasoning. A combination of 
measures examining these factors would provide important information about the 
causes underlying social deficits in autism. 
Theory of mind ability should be examined in clinical populations other than autism, 
with social and cognitive profiles both similar to and distinct from autistic profiles, in 
order to examine how theory of mind deficits, independent of an autistic 
presentation, affect social and cognitive functioning. If other clinical populations 
consistently fail theory of mind tasks, this would indicate that theory of mind deficits 
in themselves cannot account for characteristic autistic impairments. 
Longitudinal studies of the development of theory of mind, social reasoning and 
social skills throughout childhood, adolescence and adulthood in both non-autistic 
and autistic populations would provide valuable information about the interrelation 
of these factors. It would also be useful to assess social behaviour in more than one 
setting in order to get as full picture as possible of the range of social expression of 
the individual participants. 
In the current climate of evidence-based practice, further research is required into the 
efficacy and effectiveness of theory of mind interventions for social skills deficits in 
autism. Treatments for a developmental disorder such as autism should be planned 
with developmental goals in mind (Rutter, 1999). Comparisons of relative 
effectiveness of theory of mind interventions to treatment programmes with a more 
general social reasoning focus, such as Carol Gray's "Social Stories" (1994), would 
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be essential to ensure interventions were targeting the relevant developmental factors 
for children with autism. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The results from the present study demonstrate that the relationship between theory 
of mind ability, social reasoning and social impairment in autism is more complex 
than many have thought or would wish. It is clear that success on theory of mind 
tasks does not prevent social deficits. It appears there is more than one route to 
theory of mind task success and more than one route to social dysfunction in autism. 
Only by comparing performance across a whole battery of language tasks, social 
reasoning tasks and theory of mind tasks will a more complete picture of the 
cognitive processes underlying social deficits in autism become clear. 
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Initial contact letter 
Date: January, 1999 
Dear Parent 
Child's Name: 
I am a clinical psychologist in my fmal year of post-graduate training, currently on placement with the 
Child Health Team at Pitcullen House, Murray Royal Hospital. As part of my doctorate in clinical 
psychology, I am at present carrying out a research project examining the association between social 
skills and "Theory of Mind" in children with autism. Dr Mike Field, Consultant Psychiatrist, and 
Mrs Kate MacGowan, Chartered Clinical Psychologist, have discussed this project with me and 
believe you may be interested in participating. Please find enclosed an information sheet that gives 
you some details of the project. If you would like any further information or have any queries or 
concerns, please contact me, Miss Lynn Buntin at Pitcullen House, Murray Royal Hospital, Perth, 
PH2 7EA, or telephone 0 173 8-621151. 
If you and your child agree to take part, your child will be asked to complete some simple tasks 
involving answering questions about people's thoughts and behaviour in short stories. I will also ask 
you to complete some short questionnaires about your child's social skills abilities. 
If you wish, I will be pleased to give written or verbal feedback of your child's performance and 
advice, based on that performance, which may be used to guide any social skills training undertaken 
by either yourself or your child's school. Unfortunately, it will not be possible to offer individual 
treatment sessions for your child at this time. 
If you wish to participate further in this study, please complete and sign the enclosed consent fonn, 
including a daytime contact number, and return it in the prepaid envelope provided. I will then 
contact you to arrange a meeting with you and your child. 
Thank you for your assistance in reading about this study. 
Yours sincerely 
Miss Lynn Buntin 




We invite you to participate in a research project. We believe it to be of potential 
importance. However, before you decide whether or not you wish to participate, we 
need to be sure that you understand frrstly why we are doing it, and secondly what it 
would involve if you agreed. We are therefore providing you with the following 
information. Read it carefully and be sure to ask any questions you have, and, if you 
want, discuss it with outsiders. We will do our best to explain and to provide any 
further information you may ask for now or later. You do not have to make an 
immediate decision. 
• Children and adults with autism often have difficulties in social situations. One 
theory which tries to explain this problem puts this down to a difficulty in taking 
another person's point of view. This 'is sometimes called having a "Theory of 
Mind". 
• In this study, we would like to look at your child's performance on "Theory of 
Mind" tasks, and compare this to your child's social skills abilities. 
• This information may be useful in the future for targeting interventions that aim to 
remedy social skills problems to those who can best make use of them. 
• In addition, the information gathered could shed some light on the thought 
processes underlying success or failure in social situations. 
• Children within the autistic spectrum between the ages of 8 and 17 and their 
parents living in the Tayside area are being asked if they would like to participate 
in this study. 
• If you and your child agree to take part, your child will be asked to complete some 
simple assessments involving answering questions about people's thoughts and 
behaviour in short stories. This should take about 1 hour. In addition, you will be 
asked to complete two short questionnaires about your child's social skills. This 
should take about 30 minutes. 
• The assessments can take place either at Pitcullen House, Murray Royal Hospital, 
or I can arrange to visit your home or the school, whichever is most convenient for 
you and your child. 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
refuse to take part or to withdraw your child from the study at any 
time without having to give a reason and without this affecting 
his/her future medical care or his/her relationship with medical staff 
looking after him/her. 
1 
• All information gathered during the study will be treated in confidence and only 
the researchers will have access to that information. 
• If you wish to participate further in this study, please complete the attached fonn 
and return it in the prepaid envelope enclosed. 
The Tayside Committee on Medical Research Ethics that has responsibility for 
scrutinising all proposals for medical research on humans in Tayside has examined 
the proposal and has raised no objections from the point of view of medical ethics. 
(Research records may be examined by monitors from the Tayside Committee on 
Medical Research Ethics.) 
If you would like further information, please contact Miss Lynn Buntin, Pitcullen 
House, Murray Royal Hospital, Perth, PH~ 7EA. Telephone: 01738-621151. 
2 
APPENDIX4: 
Scenario for the Ice Cream V an Story 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989b) 
Scenario for 2"d order theory of mind Ice Cream V an Story (Baron-Cohen, 1989a) 
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The Birthday Puppy Story 
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994b) 
2nd Order Theory of Mind Task: Birthday Puppy Story. 
(Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994). 
Tonight it's Peter's birthday and Mum is surprising him with a puppy. She has 
hidden the puppy in the garage. Peter says, "Mum, I really hope you get me a puppy 
for my birthday." Remember, Mum wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So, 
instead of telling Peter she got him a puppy, Mum says, "Sorry Peter, I did not get 
you a puppy for your birthday. I got you a really great toy instead." 
Reality Control Question: What did Mum really get Peter for his birthday? 
Now, Peter says to Mum, "I'm going outside to play." Peter goes to the garage to 
fetch his bicycle. In the garage, Peter fmds the birthday puppy! Peter says to 
himself, "Wow, Mum didn't get me a toy, she really got me a puppy for my 
birthday." Mum does NOT see Peter go into the garage to fmd the birthday puppy. 
First-Order Ignorance Control Question: Does Peter know that him Mum got 
him a puppy for his birthday? 
Linguistic Control Question: Does Mum know that Peter saw the birthday 
puppy in the basement? 
Now, the telephone rings, ding-a-ling! Peter's grandmother calls to fmd out what 
time the birthday party is. Grandma asks Mum on the phone, "Does Peter know 
what you really got him for his birthday?" 
Second-order Ignorance Question: What does Mum say to Grandma? 
Now remember, Mum does not know that Peter saw what she got him for his 
birthday. Then, Grandma says to Mum, "What does Peter think you got him for his 
birthday?" 
Second-Order False Belief Question: What does Mum say to Grandma? 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Social Reasoning task 
(Elliott, Murray & Pearson, 1978) 
Social Reasoning 
B.A.S. 
lam going to tell you some very short stories about things that boys and girls have 
done. Each time I \\ant you to tell me what )OU think about them and why. ·1 here 
are no right or wrong answers - all you have to do is say what you think. 
1. John's ball was burst and it would not bounce, so John took Jane's new ball and 
played with that. What do you think will happen to John? ........... Why? ........ . 
2. Joe did not have many toys, but he had a teddy bear he loved very much. One 
day some older children took his teddy bear and burned it. They said it didn 't 
matter. What do you think? ........... Why? .. ............ . 
3. Jane promised her mother that she would be home for nine o'clock, but she did 
not get home until midnight. Her mother was annoyed. What do you think about 
that? ............... Why? .................... . 
4. Alan's mother promised to take Alan and his friends to the zoo for a birthday 
treat. When it was Alan 's birthday she said she was busy so they could not go. 
Do you think that was right? ................... Why? .............. . 
5. John Brown's mother likes to keep her house very clean and tidy. She is always 
telling John and his father to pick things up, put things away, take off their shoes, 
and so on. One day Mr Brown was so fed up with all this that when he was told 
to put his shoes away he threw them at his wife instead. What do you think of 
that? .................... Why? .......... . 
6. lames' father had been away from home for a long time, and his mother was very 
sad. James wanted to give a really good present to cheer her up, but he didn't 
have much money, so one night he broke a shop window and took some things 
for his mother. Then he wasn't sure whether to give her the things or to get rid of 
them. What do you think? ............ Why? .............. . 
7. Colin and Dave like reading a lot, and Colin goes to the library every Friday. 
One week, Dave went with him a saw a lot of books he wanted to read. Col in 
showed him where to go to get tickets for the library but Dave said, "Not likely", 
and took the books he wanted out under his coat. What do you 
think? ............ Why? ...... . 
APPENDIX8: 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales: Socialisation Domain 
(Sparrow, Balla & Cicchetti, 1984) 
ITEM SCORES ~-Yes.· usually 
1-Sometirries or partially 
· O- No, never 
N-No opportunity 






A. Beginning responsiveness 
0 
1. Looks at face of careg1ver . 
2. Responds to vo1ce of 
careg1ver or another person. 
3. Follows w1th eyes a person moving at 
cribside or beds1de. 
4. Stops fuss1ng when touched or picked up 
by careg1ver. 
5. Stops fussing when spoken to by caregiver. 
6. D1stmgu1shes careg1ver from others. 
SUM . 
B. Expressing emotions 
0 
1. Expresses two or more recogn1zable emotions. 
such as pleasure. sadness. fear, or distress. 
2. Shows ant1C1pat1on of be1ng 
p1cked up by careg1ver . 
3. Smiles or vocalizes to make soc1al contact . 
4 . Shows affect1on toward familiar people . 
SUM 
C. Responding t o familiar people 
1. Responds select ively to family or other 
familiar people 
2. Looks for famll1ar person when m need of 
attent1on . 
3 Reaches for f am11iar person. 
SUM 
00 
D. Imitating phrases and movements 
1. Imitates s1mple adult movements. such as 
clappmg hands or wav1ng good-bye. 1n 
response to a model 
2. lm1ta tes a relatively complex task as 1t 
1s be1ng performed by another 
3. Imitates a relatively complex task several 
hours after 1t was performed by another. 
4 . Imi tates adult phra ses heard on 
prev1ou s occa s1ons 
E. Recognizing emotions 
1 Shows des1re to please careg1ver. 
SUM 
2 Recogn1zes happmess. sadness. fear. and 
anger m others 
3 Labels happ1ness. sadness. fear. and 



















Note: Dunng admmistration, recorcfN or OK in 
the score column to represent a response or 
"no opportunity" or "don't know " 
When computmg cluster sums. count 




F. Identifying others 
1 Addresses at least two fam11iar 
people by name 
2 Verbal1zes interest m env~ronment 
3 Says names of people seen only occasiOnally. 
4 ldentd1es people by charactensucs other 
than name. when asked 
0 toe 
G. Responding to social communication 
1 Laughs or sm1les appropnately 
m response to pos1t1ve statements 
2 Responds verbally to soc1al small talk 
initiated by adults 
3 Responds verbally and positively to 
good fortune of others 
H. Friendship · 
1. Shows a preference for some fnends 
over others . 
2. Makes own fnends 
3 Has a preferred fnend of either sex 
4. Stays overn1ght at fnend s' houses and 
has friends stay overn1ght. 
5. Has a best fnend of the same sex 
8@ 




1 Knows part1cular l1kes and d1slikes of others 
2 Asks parent or careg1ver to buy g1fts for 
others on spec1al occas1ons 
3 Makes or buys small g1fts for careg1ver or 
fam1ly member on maJor hol1days. on own 
1n1t1at1ve 
4 Remembers birthdays or ann1versanes o f 
1mmed1ate fam1ly members and spec1al 
fnends 
SUM e to 9 
J. Ini tiating social communication 
1 Converses with others on top1cs of mutual 
mterest 
2. 1n111ates soc1al small ta lk when meetmg 
acqua intances 
3 lnrtlates conversa tions on top1cs of 
particular mterest to others 
SUM 












ITEM SCORES 2-Yes, usually 
1-Sometimes or partially 
O-No, never 
N-No opportunity 
DK- Don't know 
Survey Form 
Item 
0operative interact ions 
1 Has cooperauve relationships w1th frrends . 
, Places only reasonable demands 
· on frrendsh1p. 
3 Responds to hints or ind1rect cues 1n 
con versa t 10n 
elonging to groups 
· Has a group of fr1ends. 
SUM 
? Forms or JOins social "clubs" w1th others. 
j Belongs to young adolescent soc1al or 
service organi za tion. 
l Belongs to older adolescent organized club. 




1 Attends chaperoned part ies for both sexes. 
z Goes w1th one person of oppos1te sex to 
party or publiC event where many people are 
present. 
3 Goes on double or tr1ple dates . 
1 Goes on s1ngle dates. 
Ass1gn the h1ghest poss1ble sum 
to clusters before the basal. 
SUM 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS RAW SCORE 








Note: Durrng administration, record N or OK in 
the score column to represent a response of 
''no opportunity•· or "don't know." 
When computing cluster sums, count 
each N or OK as 1. 
Play and Leisure Time Subdomain 
88 
A. Playing with toys 
1. Plays w1th toy or other object alone 
or w1th others. 
2 Plays very s1mple 1nteract1on games With 
others . 
3. Plays w1th toy or other ObJec t for at least 
live m1nutes w1~hout break1ng. pull1ng apart, 
or otherw1se damag1ng 1t. 
4 Uses common household objects 
for play . 
SUM 
00 
8. Interest in environment 
1. Shows 1nterest in novel ObJeCts or new 
people . 
2. Shows Interest 1n tam1l1ar toys or other 
ObjeCtS. 
3 Shows interest in children or peers other 
than s1bl1ngs . 
4. Moves to explore new Situations 
5. Shows Interest 1n actrv1t1es of others. 
SUM 
C. Playing with others 
0 
1. Plays with others with m1n1mal supervis1on. 
2. Asks others over to play or goes to others' 
houses to play. _ 
3. Partic1pates 1n at least one game or 
activity w1th others._ 
SUM 
D. Make-believe activi t ies 
1. Uses common household objects or other 
objects for make-bel1eve activities. 
2. Engages in simple make-believe activities 
alone. 
3. Engages in simple make-believe activities 
with others . 
4. Engages in elaborate make-believe 
activities. alone or with others._ 
E. Sharing and cooperating 
SUM 
1. Shares toys or possessions with others 
when asked by caregiver._ 
2. Honors a simple bargain with caregiver. 
3. Asks permission to play with or use a toy 
or object being used by another. 
4. Shares t oys or possessions wit hout 
being told to do so . __ 
SUM 






ITEM SCORES 2-Yes. usually 








F. Watching television 
1 Chooses between two televiSIOn programs 
when asked. N MAY BE SCORED 
2 Operates televiSIOn tndependently 
N MAY BE SCORED 
3. Names one or more favonte televiSion 
programs when asked. and tells on what days 
and channels the programs are shown. 
SCORE 
N MAY BE SCORED 27 
SUM 
0 10 0 
G. Following game rules 
1 Takes turns while playtng games. when asked 
2 Plays s1mple group games tn wh1ch someone 
wins but score IS not kept 
3. Takes turns while play1ng games Without 
being reminded. 
4 Follows rules tn s1mple games w1thout 
betng reminded 
e toe 
H. Playing games 
1. Plays simple card game. 
2. Plays ~1mple board game based only 
on chance. 
SUM 
3 Plays simple game which requ1res keeping 
score . 
4 Plays more than one board or card game 
requ1ring sktll and dec1s1on making 
SUM 
I. Beginning group activities 
1. Goes places w1th fnends 
2. Goes places w1th fnends during the day 
without adult superviSIOn 
3 Goes to eventng school or I ac1lity events 
w1th friends. when accompan1ed by 




1 Collects and saves things 






3 Has a hobby 
SUM [j 
Note Dunng admtnistratton, record N or OK 10 
the score column to represent a response of 
"'no opportunity" or " don't know" 
When computing cluster sums. count 






K. Extracurricular and nonschool activities 
1 Goes to extracumcular class or actiVItY 
N MAY BE SCORED 
2 PartiCipates tn nonschool sports 
N MAY BE SCORED 
SUM 
L. Using television and radio for entertainment 
and information 
1. L1stens to rad1o for entertamment. 
N MAY BE SCORED 
2 Watches televtston or listens to rad10 for 
1nformatton about a part1cular area of 
Interest. N MAY BE SCORED 
3 Watches televtsion or listens to rad10 for 
pract1cal. day-to-day tnformatton 
N MAY BE SCORED 
4 Watches televiSion or listens to radto for 
news tndependently N MAY BE SCORED 
SUM 
M. Going places with friends independently 
1 Retra1ns from frequently askmg what to do 
2 Does th1ng s w1th frtends spontaneously 
3 Plans ahead to meet fnends 
4 Goes to evenmg school or I actl1ty events 
w1th fnends. Without adult superviSIOn 
N MAY BE SCORED 
5 Goes to even1ng nonschool or nonfac11ity 
events w1th tnends. w1thout adult supervtston 
Ass1gn the h1ghest poss1ble sum 
to clusters before the basal 
SUM 
PLAY AND LEISURE TIME RAW SCORE 
(Total of cluster sums) 








ITEM SCORES 2-Yes. usually 








;0uows household or l1v1ng un1t rules 
:0uows school or fac1l1ty rules. 
:0uows safety rules 1n recreational actJv1t1es 
>ollows community rules 
SUM 
;nning politeness 
says "thank you" when g1ven something. 
5ays "please" when ask1ng for 
;ometh,ng 
~esponds appropnately when Introduced 
·o strangers 
SUM 
~9 manners in conversat ion 
~aruc1pates m conversatiOn mvolvmg both 
:;eers and adults. without monopohz1ng 11. 
~ermns conversatiOn to continue Without 
nterrupllon. 
:nds conversatiOns appropnately 
SUM 
ng responsible for time 
nforms fam11y. housemates. or caregiver 
:f plans 
;ollows lime l1m1ts set by careg1ver. __ _ 
SUM 
g sensitive to others 
~eframs from publicly commenting about 
;,ys1cal abnormalities or ethnic at tnbutes 
lf others. 
1eframs from talkmg about personal family 
:ccurrences ou ts1de the home. 
1eframs from asking quest1ons or making 















ing secrets or confidences 
teeps secrets or conf1dences for half an hour 
'akes secrets or confidences 
s secrets or conf1dences for 
than one day 
eeps secrets or conf1dences for 






Note. Dunng admimstration. record N or OK 10 
~.he score column to represent a response of 
no opportunity" or "don't know." 
When computing cluster sums, count 
each N or OK as 1 
G. Using table manners 
1. Uses napkm to w1pe face and hands dunng 
meals 
2. Chews food w1th mouth closed 
3 Says "please" when requesting that food be 
passed. 
4 . Does not talk with food 1n mouth. 
5 Uses appropnate table manners without 
bemg told DO NOT SCORE 1. 
80) SUM 
H. Controlling impulses 
1 Controls anger or hurt feelings when plans 
are changed for unavoidable reasons 
2 Controls anger or hurt feelmgs when 
den1ed own way. 
3. Controls anger or hurt feelings at 
constructive cnt1c1sm. 
4. Independently we1ghs consequences of 
act1ons before makmg deCISions. 
0) to 8 SUM 
I. Apologizing 
1 Apologizes for unmtent1onal m1stakes 
2 Apologtzes for hurting feelings of others 
3 Apolog1zes for unmtenttonal slights. 
4 Apologizes for mistakes or errors 1n 
Judgment. 
J. Borrowing and returning 
1. Returns borrowed toys. possess1ons. or 
money to peers. or returns borrowed 
books to library. 
2. Repays money borrowed from 
careg1ver. 
K. Making and keeping appointments 
1 Makes own appointments. 
2. Makes and keeps appomtments. 
Ass1gn the highest poss1ble sum 













It would be most helpful if you could make an assessment as to whether 
your child stands out as different from other children of his/her age: 
No Somewhat Yes 
1. Is old fashioned or precocious** D D D 
2. Is regarded as an "eccentric professor" by other D D D 
children* 
3. Lives somewhat in a world of his/her own with D D D 
restricted idiosyncratic intellectual interests** 
4. Accumulates facts on certain subjects (good rote D D D 
memory) but does not really understand meaning* 
5. Has a literal understanding of spoken and/or written D D D 
language** 
6. Has a peculiar style of communication with a formal, D D D 
fussy, old fashioned or "robot-like" language* 
7. Invents idiosyncratic words and expressions D D D 
8. There is something odd about his/her voice D D D 
or speech** 
9. Expresses sounds involuntarily; clears throat, D D D 
grunts, smacks, cries or screams 
10. Is surprisingly good at some things and D D D 
surprisingly poor at others** 
11. Uses language freely but fails to make adjustment to D D D 
fit social contexts or the needs of different listeners* 
12. Lacks empathy* D D D 
13. Makes naive and embarrassing remarks** D D D 
14. Has a peculiar style of gaze D D D 
15. Wishes to be sociable but fails to make D D D 
relationships with peers* 
16. Can be together with other children but D D D 
only on his/her own terms. 
17. Has no best friends D D D 
18. Lacks common sense* D D D 
19. Is poor at games: no idea of co-operating D D D 
in a team, scores "own goals".** 
20. Has clumsy, ill co-ordinated, ungainly awkward D D D 
movements or gestures** 
21. Has involuntary face or body movements D D D 
22. Has difficulties in completing simple daily D D D 
activities because of compulsory repetition 
of certain actions or thoughts 
23. Has special routines: insists on no change* D D D 
24. Shows idiosyncratic attachment to objects D D D 
25. Is bullied by other children D D D 
26. Has notably unusual facial expression D D D 
27. Has notably unusual posture D D D 
Please specify any problems other than above: 
Child's Date of Birth: ............................................................................. . 
Date of Assessment: .............................................................................. . 
Completed by: .................................................................................... .. 
APPENDIX 10: 
Examples of answers to Strange Stories 
Examples of Participants' Justifications to Strange Stories. 
Answers Rated as Mental State Justifications 
She's just pretending. 
He doesn't want to upset her. 
She thought he was a robber. 
He wants to save his tanks. 
He's greedy. 
He knew they would think he was lying. 
She's being sarcastic. 
Answers Rated as Physical or Logical Justifications 
He looks like a ghost. 
So she doesn't get a telling off. 
Because her friend won the competition. 
Because it's a mess. 
Because the rain came on. 
Because the vase might be expensive. 
APPENDIX 11: 
Correlations between social skills and (a) theory of mind 
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